Compare commits
1 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| feae15740a |
+2
-2
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ cancer
|
||||
erl_crash.dump
|
||||
ebin/*.beam
|
||||
doc/*.html
|
||||
doc/erlang.png
|
||||
doc/stylesheet.css
|
||||
doc/*.css
|
||||
doc/edoc-info
|
||||
doc/erlang.png
|
||||
rel/example_project
|
||||
.concrete/DEV_MODE
|
||||
.rebar
|
||||
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 3.3 KiB |
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/* standard EDoc style sheet */
|
||||
body {
|
||||
font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
|
||||
margin-left: .25in;
|
||||
margin-right: .2in;
|
||||
margin-top: 0.2in;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 0.2in;
|
||||
color: #696969;
|
||||
background-color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
a:link{
|
||||
color: #000000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
a:visited{
|
||||
color: #000000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
a:hover{
|
||||
color: #d8613c;
|
||||
}
|
||||
h1,h2 {
|
||||
margin-left: -0.2in;
|
||||
}
|
||||
div.navbar {
|
||||
background-color: #000000;
|
||||
padding: 0.2em;
|
||||
}
|
||||
h2.indextitle {
|
||||
padding: 0.4em;
|
||||
color: #dfdfdf;
|
||||
background-color: #000000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
div.navbar a:link {
|
||||
color: #dfdfdf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
div.navbar a:visited {
|
||||
color: #dfdfdf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
div.navbar a:hover {
|
||||
color: #d8613c;
|
||||
}
|
||||
h3.function,h3.typedecl {
|
||||
background-color: #000000;
|
||||
color: #dfdfdf;
|
||||
padding-left: 1em;
|
||||
}
|
||||
div.spec {
|
||||
margin-left: 2em;
|
||||
background-color: #eeeeee;
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.module {
|
||||
text-decoration:none
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.module:hover {
|
||||
background-color: #eeeeee;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ul.definitions {
|
||||
list-style-type: none;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ul.index {
|
||||
list-style-type: none;
|
||||
background-color: #eeeeee;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Minor style tweaks
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ul {
|
||||
list-style-type: square;
|
||||
}
|
||||
table {
|
||||
border-collapse: collapse;
|
||||
}
|
||||
td {
|
||||
padding: 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
+3
-4
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
@author Craig Everett <craigeverett@qpq.swiss> [https://zxq9.com]
|
||||
@author Jarvis Carrol <jarviscarrol@qpq.swiss> [https://jarviscarroll.net/]
|
||||
@version 0.9.2
|
||||
@author Craig Everett <craigeverett@qpq.swiss> [https://git.qpq.swiss/QPQ-AG/hakuzaru]
|
||||
@version 0.8.0
|
||||
@title Hakuzaru: Gajumaru blockchain bindings for Erlang
|
||||
|
||||
@doc
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ After startup `hz_man' must be given the address and port of a list of Gajumaru
|
||||
Note that the service nodes will need to have the dry-run endpoint enabled and the internal service query port made available in order to provide dry-runs and transaction submission.
|
||||
|
||||
When configuring chain nodes a list of nodes should be provided.
|
||||
To avoid sync issues in the case of fast transaction formation/submission to the chain, only one node from the list of chain nodes is used for submitting transactions and querying `next_nonce/1'.
|
||||
To avoid sync issues in the case of fast transaction formation/submission to the chain, only one node from the list of chain nodes is used for submitting transactions and querying `next_nonce/1`.
|
||||
This node is called "the sticky node".
|
||||
|
||||
The first node in the list of chain nodes provided during configuration is designated as the sticky node.
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-3
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
{included_applications,[]},
|
||||
{applications,[stdlib,kernel]},
|
||||
{description,"Gajumaru interoperation library"},
|
||||
{vsn,"0.9.2"},
|
||||
{modules,[hakuzaru,hz,hz_aaci,hz_fetcher,hz_format,hz_grids,
|
||||
hz_key_master,hz_man,hz_sophia,hz_sup]},
|
||||
{vsn,"0.8.2"},
|
||||
{modules,[hakuzaru,hz,hz_fetcher,hz_format,hz_grids,
|
||||
hz_key_master,hz_man,hz_sup]},
|
||||
{mod,{hakuzaru,[]}}]}.
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hakuzaru).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
-author("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-copyright("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-license("GPL-3.0-or-later").
|
||||
|
||||
+1193
-289
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
-1673
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+1
-9
@@ -1,13 +1,5 @@
|
||||
%%% @private
|
||||
%%% Hakuzaru Request Fetcher
|
||||
%%%
|
||||
%%% This module defines the request workers.
|
||||
%%% Each request to a remote chain node is handled by a worker that is spawned
|
||||
%%% to handle it and terminates on completion.
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hz_fetcher).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
-author("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-copyright("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-license("MIT").
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-18
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hz_format).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
-author("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-copyright("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-license("GPL-3.0-or-later").
|
||||
@@ -462,26 +462,9 @@ ranks(heresy) ->
|
||||
["k ", "m ", "b ", "t ", "q ", "e ", "z ", "y ", "r ", "Q "].
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec mark(Unit) -> Mark
|
||||
when Unit :: gaju | puck,
|
||||
Mark :: $木 | $本.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Retrieve the unicode codepoint for the `gaju' mark (木) or the `puck' mark (本).
|
||||
|
||||
mark(gaju) -> $木;
|
||||
mark(puck) -> $本.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec one(Unit) -> Pucks
|
||||
when Unit :: gaju | puck,
|
||||
Pucks :: 1_000_000_000_000_000_000 | 1.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Quickly resolve the number of pucks in a given unit.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% The number of pucks in a gaju is so large that it can be a little bit annoying
|
||||
%% to remember the exact amount. This is a helper to simplify this when writing
|
||||
%% an app against the hakuzaru library when dealing in either unit.
|
||||
|
||||
one(gaju) -> 1_000_000_000_000_000_000;
|
||||
one(puck) -> 1.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+42
-44
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hz_grids).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
-export([url/2, url/3, url/4, parse/1, req/2, req/3, req/4]).
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
-export([url/2, url/3, url/4, parse/1, req/2, req/3]).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec url(Instruction, HTTP) -> Result
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
|
||||
Result :: {ok, GRIDS} | uri_string:uri_error(),
|
||||
GRIDS :: uri_string:uri_string().
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Takes an instruction and an HTTP endpoint location and forms a GRIDS URL.
|
||||
%% Takes
|
||||
|
||||
url(Instruction, HTTP) ->
|
||||
case uri_string:parse(HTTP) of
|
||||
@@ -134,8 +134,6 @@ qwargs(Amount, Payload) ->
|
||||
Amount :: non_neg_integer(),
|
||||
Payload :: binary(),
|
||||
URL :: string().
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Translate a GRIDS URL into an Erlang terms instruction.
|
||||
|
||||
parse(GRIDS) ->
|
||||
case uri_string:parse(GRIDS) of
|
||||
@@ -192,61 +190,61 @@ l_to_i(S) ->
|
||||
end.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec req(Type, Message) -> Format
|
||||
when Type :: sign | tx | ack,
|
||||
Message :: string() | binary(),
|
||||
Format :: map().
|
||||
-spec req(Type, Message) -> RequestMap
|
||||
when Type :: {sign, message | binary | bitcoin}
|
||||
| tx
|
||||
| ack
|
||||
| sign,
|
||||
Message :: binary(),
|
||||
RequestMap :: map().
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% @equiv req(Type, Message, false)
|
||||
%% GRIDS maps always contain the following keys:
|
||||
%% ```
|
||||
%% #{"grids" => 1,
|
||||
%% "chain" => "gajumaru",
|
||||
%% "network_id" => "groot.mainnet.gajumaru.io",
|
||||
%% "type" => "message" | "binary" | "binary" | "tx" | "ack"
|
||||
%% "public_id" => term(),
|
||||
%% "payload" => string()};
|
||||
%% '''
|
||||
|
||||
req(Type, Message) ->
|
||||
req(Type, Message, false).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec req(Type, Message, ID) -> Format
|
||||
when Type :: sign | tx | ack,
|
||||
Message :: string() | binary(),
|
||||
ID :: false | string() | binary(),
|
||||
Format :: map().
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Creates a GRIDS message format with the current `NetworkID'.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% The `ID' parameter indicates which key the requestee should sign with or
|
||||
%% is `false' to indicate that which key to sign with is up to the requestee.
|
||||
%% @equiv req(Type, Message, ID, CurrentNetworkID)
|
||||
|
||||
req(Type, Message, ID) ->
|
||||
{ok, NetworkID} = hz:network_id(),
|
||||
req(Type, Message, ID, NetworkID).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec req(Type, Message, ID, NetworkID) -> Format
|
||||
when Type :: sign | tx | ack,
|
||||
Message :: string() | binary(),
|
||||
ID :: false | string() | binary(),
|
||||
NetworkID :: string() | binary(),
|
||||
Format :: map().
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Creates a GRIDS message format.
|
||||
|
||||
req(sign, Message, ID, NetworkID) ->
|
||||
req({sign, message}, Message, ID) ->
|
||||
#{"grids" => 1,
|
||||
"chain" => "gajumaru",
|
||||
"network_id" => NetworkID,
|
||||
"network_id" => hz:network_id(),
|
||||
"type" => "message",
|
||||
"public_id" => ID,
|
||||
"payload" => Message};
|
||||
req(tx, Data, ID, NetworkID) ->
|
||||
req({sign, binary}, Binary, ID) ->
|
||||
#{"grids" => 1,
|
||||
"chain" => "gajumaru",
|
||||
"network_id" => NetworkID,
|
||||
"network_id" => hz:network_id(),
|
||||
"type" => "binary",
|
||||
"public_id" => ID,
|
||||
"payload" => base64:encode(Binary)};
|
||||
req({sign, bitcoin}, Binary, ID) ->
|
||||
#{"grids" => 1,
|
||||
"chain" => "gajumaru",
|
||||
"network_id" => hz:network_id(),
|
||||
"type" => "bitcoin",
|
||||
"public_id" => ID,
|
||||
"payload" => base64:encode(Binary)};
|
||||
req(tx, Data, ID) ->
|
||||
#{"grids" => 1,
|
||||
"chain" => "gajumaru",
|
||||
"network_id" => hz:network_id(),
|
||||
"type" => "tx",
|
||||
"public_id" => ID,
|
||||
"payload" => Data};
|
||||
req(ack, Message, ID, NetworkID) ->
|
||||
req(ack, Message, ID) ->
|
||||
#{"grids" => 1,
|
||||
"chain" => "gajumaru",
|
||||
"network_id" => NetworkID,
|
||||
"network_id" => hz:network_id(),
|
||||
"type" => "ack",
|
||||
"public_id" => ID,
|
||||
"payload" => Message}.
|
||||
"payload" => Message};
|
||||
req(sign, Message, ID) ->
|
||||
req({sign, message}, Message, ID).
|
||||
|
||||
+29
-238
@@ -1,43 +1,18 @@
|
||||
%%% @doc
|
||||
%%% Hakuzaru Key Functions
|
||||
%%% Key functions
|
||||
%%%
|
||||
%%% The Gajumaru's default key type is based on Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC).
|
||||
%%% The specific curve used is 25519, and the typical key representation is Ed25519.
|
||||
%%%
|
||||
%%% The "Ed" in "Ed25519" stands for Harold Edwards. This form represents
|
||||
%%% a coordinate on a "Twisted Edwards Curve".
|
||||
%%%
|
||||
%%% The "X" in "X25519" stands for the X-coordinate, also known as the
|
||||
%%% "Montgomery u-coordinate" on a "Montgomery Curve".
|
||||
%%%
|
||||
%%% The two are equivalent, but have meaningfully different properties.
|
||||
%%% The main reason this is a module of its own is that in the original architecture
|
||||
%%% it was a process rather than just a library of functions. Now that it exists, though,
|
||||
%%% there is little motivation to cram everything here into the controller process's
|
||||
%%% code.
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hz_key_master).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
|
||||
-export([make_key/0, make_key/1, encode/1, decode/1]).
|
||||
-export([shared_secret_a/6, shared_secret_b/6,
|
||||
ed25519_pk_to_x25519/1, ed25519_sk_to_x25519/1,
|
||||
hkdf/4, hkdf/5]).
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec make_key() -> {ID, KeyPair}
|
||||
when ID :: string(),
|
||||
KeyPair :: #{secret => binary(), public => binary()}.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% @equiv make_key(<<>>)
|
||||
|
||||
make_key() ->
|
||||
make_key(<<>>).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec make_key(Secret) -> {ID, KeyPair}
|
||||
when Secret :: <<>> | <<_:32*8>>,
|
||||
ID :: string(),
|
||||
KeyPair :: #{secret => binary(), public => binary()}.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Generate a Ed25519 keypair tagged with the corresponding Gajumaru ID.
|
||||
-export([make_key/1, encode/1, decode/1]).
|
||||
-export([lcg/1]).
|
||||
|
||||
make_key(<<>>) ->
|
||||
Pair = #{public := Public} = ecu_eddsa:sign_keypair(),
|
||||
@@ -151,212 +126,28 @@ sumcheck(Width, Bits) ->
|
||||
end.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec shared_secret_a(A_E_E_SK, B_P_E_PK, B_E_E_PK, Protocol, Version, Salt) -> SS
|
||||
when A_E_E_SK :: binary(),
|
||||
B_P_E_PK :: <<_:32*8>>,
|
||||
B_E_E_PK :: <<_:32*8>>,
|
||||
Protocol :: binary(),
|
||||
Version :: binary(),
|
||||
Salt :: binary(),
|
||||
SS :: <<_:32*8>>.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Alice's side of a shared key derivation based on ed25519 keys as generated by this module.
|
||||
|
||||
-spec lcg(integer()) -> integer().
|
||||
%% A simple PRNG that fits into 32 bits and is easy to implement anywhere (Kotlin).
|
||||
%% Specifically, it is a "linear congruential generator" of the Lehmer variety.
|
||||
%% The constants used are based on recommendations from Park, Miller and Stockmeyer:
|
||||
%% https://www.firstpr.com.au/dsp/rand31/p105-crawford.pdf#page=4
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% Typically Alice would be providing an ephemeral key to establish
|
||||
%% a shared secret while remaining (at least initially) anonymous from Bob. Bob,
|
||||
%% on the other hand, is providing a permanent key and also an ephemeral key,
|
||||
%% proving identity without exposing the shared secret in the future were one of
|
||||
%% the secrets to be compromised.
|
||||
%% <ul>
|
||||
%% <li>`A_E_E_SK' Alice's Ephemeral Ed25519 Secret Key.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`B_P_E_PK' Bob's Permanent Ed25519 Public Key.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`B_E_E_PK' Bob's Ephemeral Ed25519 Public Key.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`Protocol' is an arbitrary binary string, typically a protocol name in UTF-8.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`Version' is another arbitrary binary string, typically a protocol version in UTF-8.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`Salt' is a binary salt, which if empty will be replaced by a binary string of zeroes.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`SS' is the resulting 32-byte shared secret.</li>
|
||||
%% </ul>
|
||||
|
||||
shared_secret_a(A_E_E_SK, B_P_E_PK, B_E_E_PK, Protocol, Version, Salt) ->
|
||||
A_E_X_SK = ed25519_sk_to_x25519(A_E_E_SK),
|
||||
B_P_X_PK = ed25519_pk_to_x25519(B_P_E_PK),
|
||||
B_E_X_PK = ed25519_pk_to_x25519(B_E_E_PK),
|
||||
DH_Permanent = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, B_P_X_PK, A_E_X_SK, x25519),
|
||||
DH_Ephemeral = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, B_E_X_PK, A_E_X_SK, x25519),
|
||||
finalize_hkdf(DH_Permanent, DH_Ephemeral, Protocol, Version, Salt).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec shared_secret_b(B_P_E_SK, B_E_E_SK, A_E_E_PK, Protocol, Version, Salt) -> SS
|
||||
when B_P_E_SK :: binary(),
|
||||
B_E_E_SK :: binary(),
|
||||
A_E_E_PK :: <<_:32*8>>,
|
||||
Protocol :: binary(),
|
||||
Version :: binary(),
|
||||
Salt :: binary(),
|
||||
SS :: <<_:32*8>>.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Bobs's side of a shared key derivation based on ed25519 keys as generated by this module.
|
||||
%% The input value should be between 1 and 2^31-1.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% Typically Alice would be providing an ephemeral key to establish
|
||||
%% a shared secret while remaining (at least initially) anonymous from Bob. Bob,
|
||||
%% on the other hand, is providing a permanent key and also an ephemeral key,
|
||||
%% proving identity without exposing the shared secret in the future were one of
|
||||
%% the secrets to be compromised.
|
||||
%% <ul>
|
||||
%% <li>`B_P_E_SK' Bob's Permanent Ed25519 Secret Key.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`B_E_E_SK' Bob's Ephemeral Ed25519 Secret Key.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`A_E_E_PK' Alice's Ephemeral Ed25519 Public Key.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`Protocol' is an arbitrary binary string, typically a protocol name in UTF-8.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`Version' is another arbitrary binary string, typically a protocol version in UTF-8.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`Salt' is a binary salt, which if empty will be replaced by a binary string of zeroes.</li>
|
||||
%% <li>`SS' is the resulting 32-byte shared secret.</li>
|
||||
%% </ul>
|
||||
%% The purpose of this PRNG is for password-based dictionary shuffling.
|
||||
|
||||
shared_secret_b(B_P_E_SK, B_E_E_SK, A_E_E_PK, Protocol, Version, Salt) ->
|
||||
B_P_X_SK = ed25519_sk_to_x25519(B_P_E_SK),
|
||||
B_E_X_SK = ed25519_sk_to_x25519(B_E_E_SK),
|
||||
A_E_X_PK = ed25519_pk_to_x25519(A_E_E_PK),
|
||||
DH_Permanent = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, A_E_X_PK, B_P_X_SK, x25519),
|
||||
DH_Ephemeral = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, A_E_X_PK, B_E_X_SK, x25519),
|
||||
finalize_hkdf(DH_Permanent, DH_Ephemeral, Protocol, Version, Salt).
|
||||
|
||||
finalize_hkdf(DH_Permanent, DH_Ephemeral, Protocol, Version, Salt) ->
|
||||
MixedInput = <<DH_Permanent/binary, DH_Ephemeral/binary>>,
|
||||
Info = <<Protocol/binary, ":", Version/binary, ":">>,
|
||||
hkdf(sha256, MixedInput, Salt, Info).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%% Curve25519 Prime Field Constant: 2^255 - 19
|
||||
%% Yes, in hex it reads kind of like "lucky fed"
|
||||
p() -> 16#7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFED.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec ed25519_pk_to_x25519(ED25519_PubKey) -> X25519_PubKey
|
||||
when ED25519_PubKey :: <<_:32*8>>,
|
||||
X25519_PubKey :: <<_:32*8>>.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Convert a curve 25519 public key from Edwards representation to X-coordinate
|
||||
%% representation.
|
||||
|
||||
ed25519_pk_to_x25519(<<ED25519_PK:32/binary>>) ->
|
||||
<<CompressedInt:256/little-integer>> = ED25519_PK,
|
||||
% Clear the sign bit (MSB) to get the raw y-coordinate
|
||||
Y = CompressedInt band ((1 bsl 255) - 1),
|
||||
|
||||
% Compute u = (1 + y) / (1 - y) mod P
|
||||
Num = (1 + Y) rem p(),
|
||||
Den = (1 - Y + p()) rem p(),
|
||||
case Den =:= 0 of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
% If y == 1, the point maps to the point at infinity.
|
||||
% On X25519, this translates to u = 0.
|
||||
<<0:256/little-integer>>;
|
||||
false ->
|
||||
U = (Num * mod_inv(Den, p())) rem p(),
|
||||
<<U:256/little-integer>>
|
||||
lcg(N) ->
|
||||
M = 16#7FFFFFFF,
|
||||
A = 48271,
|
||||
Q = 44488, % M div A
|
||||
R = 3399, % M rem A
|
||||
Div = N div Q,
|
||||
Rem = N rem Q,
|
||||
S = Rem * A,
|
||||
T = Div * R,
|
||||
Result = S - T,
|
||||
case Result < 0 of
|
||||
false -> Result;
|
||||
true -> Result + M
|
||||
end.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec ed25519_sk_to_x25519(ED25519_SecKey) -> X25519_SecKey
|
||||
when ED25519_SecKey :: binary(),
|
||||
X25519_SecKey :: <<_:32*8>>.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% Convert a curve 25519 secret key from Edwards representation to X-coordinate
|
||||
%% representation.
|
||||
|
||||
ed25519_sk_to_x25519(<<ED25519_SK_Secret:32/binary, _/binary>>) ->
|
||||
<<X25519_SK:32/binary, _/binary>> = crypto:hash(sha512, ED25519_SK_Secret),
|
||||
X25519_SK.
|
||||
|
||||
mod_inv(A, M) ->
|
||||
{1, X, _} = ext_gcd(A, M),
|
||||
(X + M) rem M.
|
||||
|
||||
ext_gcd(A, 0) ->
|
||||
{A, 1, 0};
|
||||
ext_gcd(A, B) ->
|
||||
{G, X1, Y1} = ext_gcd(B, A rem B),
|
||||
{G, Y1, X1 - (A div B) * Y1}.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info) -> DerivedKey
|
||||
when Hash :: md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
|
||||
IKM :: binary(),
|
||||
Salt :: binary(),
|
||||
Info :: binary(),
|
||||
DerivedKey :: <<_:32*8>>.
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% 32-byte HMAC-Based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
|
||||
%% @equiv hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info) ->
|
||||
hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info, 32).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-spec hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info, Length) -> DerivedKey
|
||||
when Hash :: md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
|
||||
IKM :: binary(),
|
||||
Salt :: binary(),
|
||||
Info :: binary(),
|
||||
Length :: 16 | 20 | 28 | 32 | 48 | 64,
|
||||
DerivedKey :: binary().
|
||||
%% @doc
|
||||
%% RFC-5869 compliant HMAC-Based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% RFC-5869:
|
||||
%% <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869</a>
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% The purpose of HKDF is to take an initial, raw secret input that might
|
||||
%% be mathematically strong but structurally "clumpy" and transform it into one
|
||||
%% or more uniform, high-entropy keys suitable for use in cryptography.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% The problem is that when Alice and Bob compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret
|
||||
%% over X25519, the resulting bytes are mathematically secure, but they are not
|
||||
%% evenly distributed as random noise. Cryptographic ciphers expect keys where
|
||||
%% every single bit has an exactly 50% chance of being a 0 or a 1. Passing raw
|
||||
%% DH outputs straight into a cipher can introduce subtle, exploitable patterns.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% HKDF "smooths out" the entropy.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% HMAC stands for "Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code", but without the
|
||||
%% leading "K" just to keep us on our toes. The problem it solves is that simply
|
||||
%% concatenating a secret and some target data and hashing them together to produce
|
||||
%% a message authentication hash leaves the resulting hash vulnerable to a "length
|
||||
%% extension attack". An attacker can append additional data to the end of the
|
||||
%% message and arrive at a valid new hash without ever knowing the secret.
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% RFC-2104 provides good background information on the technique:
|
||||
%% <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104</a>
|
||||
|
||||
hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info, Length) ->
|
||||
PRK = extract(Hash, Salt, IKM),
|
||||
expand(Hash, PRK, Info, Length).
|
||||
|
||||
extract(Hash, <<>>, IKM) ->
|
||||
%% If salt is empty RFC 5869 requires a string of zeros equal to hash size
|
||||
Salt = binary:copy(<<0>>, hash_size(Hash)),
|
||||
extract(Hash, Salt, IKM);
|
||||
extract(Hash, Salt, IKM) ->
|
||||
crypto:mac(hmac, Hash, Salt, IKM).
|
||||
|
||||
expand(Hash, PRK, Info, OutLen) ->
|
||||
HashLen = hash_size(Hash),
|
||||
BlockCount = (OutLen + HashLen - 1) div HashLen,
|
||||
true = BlockCount =< 255,
|
||||
FullBlocks = expand_loop(Hash, PRK, Info, BlockCount, 1, <<>>, <<>>),
|
||||
<<Output:OutLen/binary, _/binary>> = FullBlocks,
|
||||
Output.
|
||||
|
||||
expand_loop(Hash, PRK, Info, N, Counter, PrevT, Acc) when Counter =< N ->
|
||||
Payload = <<PrevT/binary, Info/binary, Counter:8>>,
|
||||
T = crypto:mac(hmac, Hash, PRK, Payload),
|
||||
expand_loop(Hash, PRK, Info, N, Counter + 1, T, <<Acc/binary, T/binary>>);
|
||||
expand_loop(_, _, _, _, _, _, Acc) ->
|
||||
Acc.
|
||||
|
||||
hash_size(md5) -> 16;
|
||||
hash_size(sha) -> 20;
|
||||
hash_size(sha224) -> 28;
|
||||
hash_size(sha256) -> 32;
|
||||
hash_size(sha384) -> 48;
|
||||
hash_size(sha512) -> 64.
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-1
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hz_man).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
-behavior(gen_server).
|
||||
-author("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
-copyright("Craig Everett <ceverett@tsuriai.jp>").
|
||||
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ start_link() ->
|
||||
%% preparatory work necessary for proper function.
|
||||
|
||||
init(none) ->
|
||||
ok = io:format("hz_man starting.~n"),
|
||||
State = #s{},
|
||||
{ok, State}.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-1521
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+1
-1
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
%%% @end
|
||||
|
||||
-module(hz_sup).
|
||||
-vsn("0.9.2").
|
||||
-vsn("0.8.2").
|
||||
-behaviour(supervisor).
|
||||
-author("Craig Everett <zxq9@zxq9.com>").
|
||||
-copyright("Craig Everett <zxq9@zxq9.com>").
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
|
||||
{type,app}.
|
||||
{modules,[]}.
|
||||
{prefix,"hz"}.
|
||||
{author,"Craig Everett"}.
|
||||
{desc,"Gajumaru interoperation library"}.
|
||||
{package_id,{"otpr","hakuzaru",{0,9,2}}}.
|
||||
{author,"Craig Everett"}.
|
||||
{package_id,{"otpr","hakuzaru",{0,8,2}}}.
|
||||
{deps,[{"otpr","sophia",{9,0,0}},
|
||||
{"otpr","gmserialization",{0,1,3}},
|
||||
{"otpr","gmbytecode",{3,4,1}},
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user