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Author SHA1 Message Date
029292817e Merge pull request 'Ditch enacl, support DH448 and Blake2s, and fix types (#14)' (#2) from hanssv-remove-enoise into master
Reviewed-on: #2
2025-03-30 05:02:52 +09:00
Hans Svensson
2b5f08e156 Ditch enacl, support DH448 and Blake2s, and fix types (#14)
* Remove get_stacktrace (deprecated since OTP-24)

* Add DH448 support and switch to crypto:generate_key for DH25519

* Switch to crypto:hash/2 for Blake2b and support Blake2s

* Switch last enacl calls to crypto - no more enacl

* Eqwalizer fixes

Ewqalizer fix

Eqwalizer fix

Eqwalizer fix

Eqwalizer fix

Eqwalizer support

Eqwalizer fix

Fix tests to follow types (remote keys)

* More error handling on setup

* Dialyzer fix

* Write CHANGELOG

* Note about type-checking in README
2025-03-30 05:02:35 +09:00
Ulf Wiger
91916908a0 Revert "Update enacl dep and fix some minor details (#1)"
This reverts commit 479ec7087031b3b69ca2dd9b5c8e471d0a1125cd.
2025-03-29 20:57:45 +01:00
479ec70870 Update enacl dep and fix some minor details (#1)
Co-authored-by: Ulf Wiger <ulf@wiger.net>
Reviewed-on: #1
2025-03-08 00:28:12 +09:00
Hans Svensson
8acbce9269
Merge pull request #13 from aeternity/prepare_1.2.0
Bump version to 1.2.0
2021-10-28 15:46:01 +02:00
Hans Svensson
be39bbc464 Bump version to 1.2.0 2021-10-28 15:35:00 +02:00
Hans Svensson
dd94b371e6
Merge pull request #12 from aeternity/support-otp-24
Use new crypto:block_encrypt api
2021-10-28 15:05:56 +02:00
Hans Svensson
11ca32c72f
Merge pull request #11 from lrascao/fix-rekey
Fix rekey, improve coverage
2021-10-28 15:00:58 +02:00
Sean Hinde
71300ba5b6 Use new crypto:block_encrypt api 2021-10-28 14:54:41 +02:00
Luis Rascao
ffde489e53 Fix rekey, improve coverage
ChaChaPoly key is expected to be 256 bits long. It's safe to disregard
the MAC portion.
2021-04-27 15:40:58 +01:00
Hans Svensson
991d7390ea
Merge pull request #10 from aeternity/prepare_1.1
Prepare version 1.1.0
2020-09-24 22:25:27 +02:00
Hans Svensson
83fa0d5a00 Bump version to 1.1.0 2020-09-24 22:21:47 +02:00
Hans Svensson
336b331b8a Introduce CHANGELOG.md 2020-09-24 22:21:25 +02:00
Hans Svensson
fc4a41f13d
Merge pull request #9 from aeternity/misc_improvements
Include cacaphony test vectors
2020-09-24 22:05:38 +02:00
Hans Svensson
3819ba5c0f
Merge pull request #8 from helium/madninja/upgrade_enacl
Upgrade enacl to 1.1.1
2020-09-24 21:59:23 +02:00
Hans Svensson
98d18bcaa5 Use cacaphony test vectors 2020-09-24 21:52:14 +02:00
Marc Nijdam
a3e803fc1a
Upgrade enacl to 1.1.1 2020-09-22 17:44:54 -06:00
Hans Svensson
1e6ee6703f More improved typespecs 2019-01-29 09:08:17 +01:00
Hans Svensson
7c7ad54a6a Improve type specs 2019-01-28 15:05:21 +01:00
20 changed files with 29912 additions and 14619 deletions

54
CHANGELOG.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
# Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Support for 448 DH function and Blake2s hash function.
### Changed
- Using `crypto` over `enacl` (and removing a call to `get_stacktrace/1`) makes `enoise`
up to date for (at least) OTP-27.
- Added test dependency `eqwalizer_support` to enable checking types with Eqwalizer.
### Removed
- The dependency on `enacl` is not needed anymore, OTP's `crypto` library now cover all
necessary operations.
## [1.2.0] - 2021-10-28
### Added
### Changed
- Use the new AEAD crypto interface introduced in OTP 22. This makes `enoise` OPT 24 compatible
but it also means it no longer works on OTP 21 and earlier. You can't win them all.
- Fixed ChaChaPoly20 rekey
### Removed
## [1.1.0] - 2020-09-24
### Added
Include [Cacaphony](https://github.com/centromere/cacophony) test vectors.
### Changed
Updated `enacl` to version [1.1.1](https://github.com/jlouis/enacl/releases/tag/v1.1.1).
Fixed some imprecise type specifications.
### Removed
## [1.0.1] - 2018-12-21
### Added
### Changed
Improved argument checks and error handling in handshake (in particular related to empty
hand shake messages).
### Removed
## [1.0] - 2018-10-09
Initial version the following map describe what is supported:
```
#{ hs_pattern => [nn, kn, nk, kk, nx, kx, xn, in, xk, ik, xx, ix]
, hash => [blake2b, sha256, sha512]
, cipher => ['ChaChaPoly', 'AESGCM']
, dh => [dh25519] }
```
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/aeternity/aesophia_cli/compare/v1.2.0...HEAD
[1.2.0]: https://github.com/aeternity/aesophia_cli/compare/v1.1.0...v1.2.0
[1.1.0]: https://github.com/aeternity/aesophia_cli/compare/v1.0.1...v1.1.0
[1.0.1]: https://github.com/aeternity/aesophia_cli/compare/v1.0.0...v1.0.1
[1.0.0]: https://github.com/aeternity/enoise/releases/tag/v1.0.0

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@ -39,3 +39,9 @@ Test
----
$ rebar3 eunit
Typecheck
---------
$ rebar3 dialyzer
$ elp --eqwalize-all --rebar

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@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
{erl_opts, [debug_info]}.
{plugins, [rebar3_hex]}.
{deps, [{enacl, "0.17.2"}]}.
{profiles, [{test, [{deps, [{jsx, {git, "https://github.com/talentdeficit/jsx.git", {tag, "2.8.0"}}}]}]}
{profiles, [{test, [{deps, [ {jsx, {git, "https://github.com/talentdeficit/jsx.git", {tag, "2.8.0"}}}
, {eqwalizer_support, {git_subdir, "https://github.com/whatsapp/eqwalizer.git", {branch, "main"}, "eqwalizer_support"}}
]}
]}
]}.
{xref_checks, [undefined_function_calls, undefined_functions,
locals_not_used,
deprecated_function_calls, deprecated_functions]}.
{dialyzer, [{warnings, [unknown]}]}.

View File

@ -1,6 +1 @@
{"1.1.0",
[{<<"enacl">>,{pkg,<<"enacl">>,<<"0.17.2">>},0}]}.
[
{pkg_hash,[
{<<"enacl">>, <<"4AD59142943E72D72C56E33C30DEDEF28ADD8EBEE79C51033562B0CB4B93EDE0">>}]}
].
[].

View File

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
{application, enoise,
[{description, "An Erlang implementation of the Noise protocol"},
{vsn, "1.0.1"},
{vsn, "1.2.0"},
{registered, []},
{applications,
[kernel,
stdlib,
enacl
crypto
]},
{env,[]},
{modules, []},

View File

@ -64,11 +64,9 @@ binary().
send_msg := send_msg_fun(),
state := term() }.
%% Noise communication state - used to parameterize a handshake. Consists of a
%% send function one receive function and an internal state.
%% send function, one receive function, and an internal state.
-type noise_split_state() :: #{ rx := enoise_cipher_state:state(),
tx := enoise_cipher_state:state(),
hs_hash := binary() }.
-type noise_split_state() :: enoise_hs_state:noise_split_state().
%% Return value from the final `split' operation. Provides a CipherState for
%% receiving and a CipherState transmission. Also includes the final handshake
%% hash for channel binding.
@ -89,8 +87,7 @@ binary().
Role :: enoise_hs_state:noise_role()) ->
{ok, enoise_hs_state:state()} | {error, term()}.
handshake(Options, Role) ->
HState = create_hstate(Options, Role),
{ok, HState}.
create_hstate(Options, Role).
%% @doc Do a step (either `{send, Payload}', `{rcvd, EncryptedData}',
%% or `done')
@ -111,10 +108,13 @@ step_handshake(HState, Data) ->
ComState :: noise_com_state()) ->
{ok, noise_split_state(), noise_com_state()} | {error, term()}.
handshake(Options, Role, ComState) ->
HState = create_hstate(Options, Role),
case create_hstate(Options, Role) of
{ok, HState} ->
Timeout = proplists:get_value(timeout, Options, infinity),
do_handshake(HState, ComState, Timeout).
do_handshake(HState, ComState, Timeout);
Err = {error, _} ->
Err
end.
%% @doc Upgrades a gen_tcp, or equivalent, connected socket to a Noise socket,
%% that is, performs the client-side noise handshake.
@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ connect(TcpSock, Options) ->
%% @end
-spec accept(TcpSock :: gen_tcp:socket(),
Options :: noise_options()) ->
{ok, noise_socket()} | {error, term()}.
{ok, noise_socket(), enoise_hs_state:state()} | {error, term()}.
accept(TcpSock, Options) ->
tcp_handshake(TcpSock, responder, Options).
@ -272,15 +272,16 @@ create_hstate(Options, Role) ->
enoise_protocol:from_name(X);
_ -> NoiseProtocol0
end,
DH = enoise_protocol:dh(NoiseProtocol),
S = proplists:get_value(s, Options, undefined),
E = proplists:get_value(e, Options, undefined),
RS = proplists:get_value(rs, Options, undefined),
RE = proplists:get_value(re, Options, undefined),
RS = remote_keypair(DH, proplists:get_value(rs, Options, undefined)),
RE = remote_keypair(DH, proplists:get_value(re, Options, undefined)),
enoise_hs_state:init(NoiseProtocol, Role,
Prologue, {S, E, RS, RE}).
check_gen_tcp(TcpSock) ->
case inet:getopts(TcpSock, [mode, packet, active, header, packet_size]) of
{ok, TcpOpts} ->
@ -323,3 +324,5 @@ gen_tcp_rcv_msg({TcpSock, Active, Buf}, Timeout) ->
{error, timeout}
end.
remote_keypair(_DH, undefined) -> undefined;
remote_keypair(DH, RemotePub) when is_binary(RemotePub) -> enoise_keypair:new(DH, RemotePub).

View File

@ -50,11 +50,12 @@ set_nonce(CState = #noise_cs{}, Nonce) ->
CState#noise_cs{ n = Nonce }.
-spec encrypt_with_ad(CState :: state(), AD :: binary(), PlainText :: binary()) ->
{ok, state(), binary()}.
{ok, state(), binary()} | {error, term()}.
encrypt_with_ad(CState = #noise_cs{ k = empty }, _AD, PlainText) ->
{ok, CState, PlainText};
encrypt_with_ad(CState = #noise_cs{ k = K, n = N, cipher = Cipher }, AD, PlainText) ->
{ok, CState#noise_cs{ n = N+1 }, enoise_crypto:encrypt(Cipher, K, N, AD, PlainText)}.
CipherText = enoise_crypto:encrypt(Cipher, K, N, AD, PlainText),
{ok, CState#noise_cs{ n = N+1 }, CipherText}.
-spec decrypt_with_ad(CState :: state(), AD :: binary(), CipherText :: binary()) ->
{ok, state(), binary()} | {error, term()}.
@ -69,6 +70,8 @@ decrypt_with_ad(CState = #noise_cs{ k = K, n = N, cipher = Cipher }, AD, CipherT
end.
-spec rekey(CState :: state()) -> state().
rekey(CState = #noise_cs{ k = empty }) ->
CState;
rekey(CState = #noise_cs{ k = K, cipher = Cipher }) ->
CState#noise_cs{ k = enoise_crypto:rekey(Cipher, K) }.

View File

@ -53,15 +53,19 @@ start_link(TcpSock, Rx, Tx, Owner, {Active0, Buf}) ->
Err
end.
-spec send(Noise :: pid(), Data :: binary()) -> ok | {error, term()}.
send(Noise, Data) ->
gen_server:call(Noise, {send, Data}).
-spec set_active(Noise :: pid(), Active :: true | once) -> ok | {error, term()}.
set_active(Noise, Active) ->
gen_server:call(Noise, {active, self(), Active}).
-spec close(Noise :: pid()) -> ok | {error, term()}.
close(Noise) ->
gen_server:call(Noise, close).
-spec controlling_process(Noise :: pid(), NewPid :: pid()) -> ok | {error, term()}.
controlling_process(Noise, NewPid) ->
gen_server:call(Noise, {controlling_process, self(), NewPid}, 100).

View File

@ -30,12 +30,17 @@
%% and the public key from `Key2' with algorithm `Algo'.
-spec dh(Algo :: enoise_hs_state:noise_dh(),
Key1:: keypair(), Key2 :: keypair()) -> binary().
dh(dh25519, Key1, Key2) ->
enacl:curve25519_scalarmult( enoise_keypair:seckey(Key1)
, enoise_keypair:pubkey(Key2));
dh(Type, Key1, Key2) when Type == dh25519; Type == dh448 ->
dh_(ecdh_type(Type), enoise_keypair:pubkey(Key2), enoise_keypair:seckey(Key1));
dh(Type, _Key1, _Key2) ->
error({unsupported_diffie_hellman, Type}).
ecdh_type(dh25519) -> x25519;
ecdh_type(dh448) -> x448.
dh_(DHType, OtherPub, MyPriv) ->
crypto:compute_key(ecdh, OtherPub, MyPriv, DHType).
-spec hmac(Hash :: enoise_sym_state:noise_hash(),
Key :: binary(), Data :: binary()) -> binary().
hmac(Hash, Key, Data) ->
@ -54,38 +59,42 @@ hkdf(Hash, Key, Data) ->
Output3 = hmac(Hash, TempKey, <<Output2/binary, 3:8>>),
[Output1, Output2, Output3].
-spec rekey(Cipher :: enoise_cipher_state:noise_cipher(),
Key :: binary()) -> binary().
-spec rekey(Cipher :: enoise_cipher_state:noise_cipher(), Key :: binary()) -> binary().
rekey('ChaChaPoly', K0) ->
KLen = 32,
<<K:KLen/binary, _/binary>> = encrypt('ChaChaPoly', K0, ?MAX_NONCE, <<>>, <<0:(32*8)>>),
K;
rekey(Cipher, K) ->
encrypt(Cipher, K, ?MAX_NONCE, <<>>, <<0:(32*8)>>).
-spec encrypt(Cipher :: enoise_cipher_state:noise_cipher(),
Key :: binary(), Nonce :: non_neg_integer(),
Ad :: binary(), PlainText :: binary()) ->
binary() | {error, term()}.
encrypt('ChaChaPoly', K, N, Ad, PlainText) ->
enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(K, N, Ad, PlainText);
encrypt('AESGCM', K, N, Ad, PlainText) ->
Nonce = <<0:32, N:64>>,
{CipherText, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(aes_gcm, K, Nonce, {Ad, PlainText}),
<<CipherText/binary, CipherTag/binary>>.
-spec encrypt(Cipher :: enoise_cipher_state:noise_cipher(), Key :: binary(),
Nonce :: non_neg_integer(), Ad :: binary(), PlainText :: binary()) -> binary().
encrypt(Cipher, K, N, Ad, PlainText) ->
{CText, CTag} = crypto:crypto_one_time_aead(cipher(Cipher), K, nonce(Cipher, N), PlainText, Ad, true),
<<CText/binary, CTag/binary>>.
-spec decrypt(Cipher ::enoise_cipher_state:noise_cipher(),
Key :: binary(), Nonce :: non_neg_integer(),
AD :: binary(), CipherText :: binary()) ->
binary() | {error, term()}.
decrypt('ChaChaPoly', K, N, Ad, CipherText) ->
enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(K, N, Ad, CipherText);
decrypt('AESGCM', K, N, Ad, CipherText0) ->
-spec decrypt(Cipher ::enoise_cipher_state:noise_cipher(), Key :: binary(),
Nonce :: non_neg_integer(), AD :: binary(),
CipherText :: binary()) -> binary() | {error, term()}.
decrypt(Cipher, K, N, Ad, CipherText0) ->
CTLen = byte_size(CipherText0) - ?MAC_LEN,
<<CipherText:CTLen/binary, MAC:?MAC_LEN/binary>> = CipherText0,
Nonce = <<0:32, N:64>>,
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_gcm, K, Nonce, {Ad, CipherText, MAC}).
<<CText:CTLen/binary, MAC:?MAC_LEN/binary>> = CipherText0,
case crypto:crypto_one_time_aead(cipher(Cipher), K, nonce(Cipher, N), CText, Ad, MAC, false) of
error -> {error, decrypt_failed};
Data -> Data
end.
nonce('ChaChaPoly', N) -> <<0:32, N:64/little-unsigned-integer>>;
nonce('AESGCM', N) -> <<0:32, N:64/big-unsigned-integer>>.
cipher('ChaChaPoly') -> chacha20_poly1305;
cipher('AESGCM') -> aes_256_gcm.
-spec hash(Hash :: enoise_sym_state:noise_hash(), Data :: binary()) -> binary().
hash(blake2s, Data) ->
crypto:hash(blake2s, Data);
hash(blake2b, Data) ->
{ok, Hash} = enacl:generichash(64, Data), Hash;
crypto:hash(blake2b, Data);
hash(sha256, Data) ->
crypto:hash(sha256, Data);
hash(sha512, Data) ->

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@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
-type noise_dh() :: dh25519 | dh448.
-type noise_token() :: s | e | ee | ss | es | se.
-type keypair() :: enoise_keypair:keypair().
-type noise_split_state() :: #{ rx := enoise_cipher_state:state(),
tx := enoise_cipher_state:state(),
hs_hash := binary(),
final_state => state() }.
-type optional_key() :: undefined | keypair().
-type initial_keys() :: {optional_key(), optional_key(), optional_key(), optional_key()}.
-record(noise_hs, { ss :: enoise_sym_state:state()
, s :: keypair() | undefined
@ -32,13 +39,10 @@
, msgs = [] :: [enoise_protocol:noise_msg()] }).
-opaque state() :: #noise_hs{}.
-export_type([noise_dh/0, noise_role/0, noise_token/0, state/0]).
-export_type([noise_dh/0, noise_role/0, noise_split_state/0, noise_token/0, state/0]).
-spec init(Protocol :: string() | enoise_protocol:protocol(),
Role :: noise_role(), Prologue :: binary(),
Keys :: term()) -> state().
init(ProtocolName, Role, Prologue, Keys) when is_list(ProtocolName) ->
init(enoise_protocol:from_name(ProtocolName), Role, Prologue, Keys);
-spec init(Protocol :: enoise_protocol:protocol(), Role :: noise_role(),
Prologue :: binary(), Keys :: initial_keys()) -> {ok, state()} | {error, term()}.
init(Protocol, Role, Prologue, {S, E, RS, RE}) ->
SS0 = enoise_sym_state:init(Protocol),
SS1 = enoise_sym_state:mix_hash(SS0, Prologue),
@ -48,13 +52,21 @@ init(Protocol, Role, Prologue, {S, E, RS, RE}) ->
, dh = enoise_protocol:dh(Protocol)
, msgs = enoise_protocol:msgs(Role, Protocol) },
PreMsgs = enoise_protocol:pre_msgs(Role, Protocol),
lists:foldl(fun({out, [s]}, HS0) -> mix_hash(HS0, enoise_keypair:pubkey(S));
({out, [e]}, HS0) -> mix_hash(HS0, enoise_keypair:pubkey(E));
({in, [s]}, HS0) -> mix_hash(HS0, enoise_keypair:pubkey(RS));
({in, [e]}, HS0) -> mix_hash(HS0, enoise_keypair:pubkey(RE))
end, HS, PreMsgs).
pre_mix(PreMsgs, HS).
-spec finalize(HS :: state()) -> {ok, map()} | {error, term()}.
pre_mix([], HS) -> {ok, HS};
pre_mix([{out, [s]} | Msgs], HS = #noise_hs{ s = S }) when S /= undefined ->
pre_mix(Msgs, mix_hash(HS, enoise_keypair:pubkey(S)));
pre_mix([{out, [e]} | Msgs], HS = #noise_hs{ e = E }) when E /= undefined ->
pre_mix(Msgs, mix_hash(HS, enoise_keypair:pubkey(E)));
pre_mix([{in, [s]} | Msgs], HS = #noise_hs{ rs = RS }) when RS /= undefined ->
pre_mix(Msgs, mix_hash(HS, enoise_keypair:pubkey(RS)));
pre_mix([{in, [e]} | Msgs], HS = #noise_hs{ re = RE }) when RE /= undefined ->
pre_mix(Msgs, mix_hash(HS, enoise_keypair:pubkey(RE)));
pre_mix(_Msg, _HS) ->
{error, invalid_noise_setup}.
-spec finalize(HS :: state()) -> {ok, noise_split_state()} | {error, term()}.
finalize(HS = #noise_hs{ msgs = [], ss = SS, role = Role }) ->
{C1, C2} = enoise_sym_state:split(SS),
HSHash = enoise_sym_state:h(SS),
@ -68,7 +80,7 @@ finalize(_) ->
-spec next_message(HS :: state()) -> in | out | done.
next_message(#noise_hs{ msgs = [{Dir, _} | _] }) -> Dir;
next_message(_) -> done.
next_message(#noise_hs{ }) -> done.
-spec write_message(HS :: state(), PayLoad :: binary()) -> {ok, state(), binary()}.
write_message(HS = #noise_hs{ msgs = [{out, Msg} | Msgs] }, PayLoad) ->
@ -85,6 +97,7 @@ read_message(HS = #noise_hs{ msgs = [{in, Msg} | Msgs] }, Message) ->
Err = {error, _} -> Err
end.
-spec remote_keys(HS :: state()) -> undefined | keypair().
remote_keys(#noise_hs{ rs = RS }) ->
RS.

View File

@ -30,13 +30,15 @@
%% @doc Generate a new keypair of type `Type'.
-spec new(Type :: key_type()) -> keypair().
new(Type) ->
{Sec, Pub} = new_key_pair(Type),
{Pub, Sec} = new_key_pair(Type),
#kp{ type = Type, sec = Sec, pub = Pub }.
%% @doc Create a new keypair of type `Type'. If `Public' is `undefined'
%% it will be computed from the `Secret' (using the curve/algorithm
%% indicated by `Type').
-spec new(Type :: key_type(), Secret :: binary(), Public :: binary() | undefined) -> keypair().
-spec new(Type :: key_type(),
Secret :: binary() | undefined,
Public :: binary() | undefined) -> keypair().
new(Type, Secret, undefined) ->
new(Type, Secret, pubkey_from_secret(Type, Secret));
new(Type, Secret, Public) ->
@ -67,12 +69,14 @@ seckey(#kp{ sec = S }) ->
S.
%% -- Local functions --------------------------------------------------------
new_key_pair(dh25519) ->
KeyPair = enacl:crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(),
{enacl:crypto_sign_ed25519_secret_to_curve25519(maps:get(secret, KeyPair)),
enacl:crypto_sign_ed25519_public_to_curve25519(maps:get(public, KeyPair))};
new_key_pair(Type) when Type == dh25519; Type == dh448 ->
crypto:generate_key(ecdh, ecdh_type(Type));
new_key_pair(Type) ->
error({unsupported_key_type, Type}).
pubkey_from_secret(dh25519, Secret) ->
enacl:curve25519_scalarmult_base(Secret).
pubkey_from_secret(Type, Secret) when Type == dh25519; Type == dh448 ->
{Public, Secret} = crypto:generate_key(ecdh, ecdh_type(Type), Secret),
Public.
ecdh_type(dh25519) -> x25519;
ecdh_type(dh448) -> x448.

View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
, to_name/1]).
-ifdef(TEST).
-export([to_name/4]).
-export([to_name/4, from_name_pattern/1, to_name_pattern/1]).
-endif.
-type noise_pattern() :: nn | kn | nk | kk | nx | kx | xn | in | xk | ik | xx | ix.
@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ pre_msgs(Role, #noise_protocol{ hs_pattern = Pattern }) ->
{PreMsgs, _Msgs} = protocol(Pattern),
role_adapt(Role, PreMsgs).
-spec role_adapt(Role :: enoise_hs_state:noise_role(), [noise_msg()]) -> [noise_msg()].
role_adapt(initiator, Msgs) ->
Msgs;
role_adapt(responder, Msgs) ->
@ -136,9 +137,9 @@ supported_dh(Dh) ->
-spec supported() -> map().
supported() ->
#{ hs_pattern => [nn, kn, nk, kk, nx, kx, xn, in, xk, ik, xx, ix]
, hash => [blake2b, sha256, sha512]
, hash => [blake2s, blake2b, sha256, sha512]
, cipher => ['ChaChaPoly', 'AESGCM']
, dh => [dh25519]
, dh => [dh25519, dh448]
}.
to_name(Pattern, Dh, Cipher, Hash) ->
@ -147,16 +148,16 @@ to_name(Pattern, Dh, Cipher, Hash) ->
to_name_pattern(Atom) ->
[Simple | Rest] = string:lexemes(atom_to_list(Atom), "_"),
string:uppercase(Simple) ++ lists:join("+", Rest).
lists:flatten(string:uppercase(Simple) ++ lists:join("+", Rest)).
from_name_pattern(String) ->
[Init | Mod2] = string:lexemes(String, "+"),
{Simple, Mod1} = lists:splitwith(fun(C) -> C >= $A andalso C =< $Z end, Init),
list_to_atom(string:lowercase(Simple) ++
list_to_atom(lists:flatten(string:lowercase(Simple) ++
case Mod1 of
"" -> "";
_ -> "_" ++ lists:join([Mod1 | Mod2], "_")
end).
_ -> "_" ++ lists:join("_", [Mod1 | Mod2])
end)).
to_name_dh(dh25519) -> "25519";
to_name_dh(dh448) -> "448".

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@ -26,5 +26,14 @@ chachapoly_test() ->
enoise_cipher_state:decrypt_with_ad(CS1, AD, <<CipherText/binary, MAC/binary>>),
?assertMatch(PlainText, PlainText0),
% rekey test
CS4 = enoise_cipher_state:rekey(CS1),
{ok, _CS5, <<CipherText1:CTLen/binary, MAC1:MACLen/binary>>} =
enoise_cipher_state:encrypt_with_ad(CS4, AD, PlainText),
{ok, _CS6, <<PlainText1:PTLen/binary>>} =
enoise_cipher_state:decrypt_with_ad(CS4, AD, <<CipherText1/binary, MAC1/binary>>),
?assertMatch(PlainText, PlainText1),
ok.

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@ -44,6 +44,13 @@ chachapoly_test() ->
enoise_crypto:decrypt('ChaChaPoly', Key, Nonce, AD, <<CipherText/binary, MAC/binary>>),
?assertMatch(PlainText, PlainText0),
Key1 = enoise_crypto:rekey('ChaChaPoly', Key),
<<CipherText1:CTLen/binary, MAC1:MACLen/binary>> =
enoise_crypto:encrypt('ChaChaPoly', Key1, Nonce, AD, PlainText),
<<PlainText1:PTLen/binary>> =
enoise_crypto:decrypt('ChaChaPoly', Key1, Nonce, AD, <<CipherText1/binary, MAC1/binary>>),
?assertMatch(PlainText, PlainText1),
ok.
blake2b_test() ->

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@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ noise_hs_test_() ->
fun() -> test_utils:noise_test_vectors() end,
fun(_X) -> ok end,
fun(Tests) ->
[ {maps:get(name, T), fun() -> noise_hs_test(T) end}
[ {maps:get(protocol_name, T), fun() -> noise_hs_test(T) end}
|| T <- test_utils:noise_test_filter(Tests) ]
end
}.
noise_hs_test(V = #{ name := Name }) ->
noise_hs_test(V = #{ protocol_name := Name }) ->
Protocol = enoise_protocol:from_name(Name),
FixK = fun(undefined) -> undefined;
@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ noise_test(_Name, Protocol, Init, Resp, Messages, HSHash) ->
SecK = fun(undefined) -> undefined; (Sec) -> enoise_keypair:new(DH, Sec, undefined) end,
PubK = fun(undefined) -> undefined; (Pub) -> enoise_keypair:new(DH, Pub) end,
HSInit = fun(P, R, #{ e := E, s := S, rs := RS, prologue := PL }) ->
enoise_hs_state:init(P, R, PL, {SecK(S), SecK(E), PubK(RS), undefined})
{ok, HS} = enoise_hs_state:init(P, R, PL, {SecK(S), SecK(E), PubK(RS), undefined}),
HS
end,
InitHS = HSInit(Protocol, initiator, Init),

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@ -7,5 +7,18 @@
-include_lib("eunit/include/eunit.hrl").
name_test() ->
?assertMatch(<<"Noise_XK_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA512">>,
enoise_protocol:to_name(enoise_protocol:from_name("Noise_XK_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA512"))).
roundtrip("Noise_XK_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA512"),
roundtrip("Noise_NN_25519_AESGCM_BLAKE2b").
name2_test() ->
Name = "Noise_NXpsk2_25519_AESGCM_SHA512",
?assertError({name_not_recognized, Name}, enoise_protocol:from_name(Name)).
name_pattern_test() ->
Pat = "XKfallback+psk0",
RoundPat = enoise_protocol:to_name_pattern(enoise_protocol:from_name_pattern(Pat)),
?assertEqual(Pat, RoundPat).
roundtrip(Name) ->
ExpectedName = iolist_to_binary(Name),
?assertMatch(ExpectedName, enoise_protocol:to_name(enoise_protocol:from_name(Name))).

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@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ noise_interactive_test_() ->
fun() -> test_utils:noise_test_vectors() end,
fun(_X) -> ok end,
fun(Tests) ->
[ {maps:get(name, T), fun() -> noise_interactive(T) end}
[ {maps:get(protocol_name, T), fun() -> noise_interactive(T) end}
|| T <- test_utils:noise_test_filter(Tests) ]
end
}.
noise_interactive(V = #{ name := Name }) ->
noise_interactive(V = #{ protocol_name := Name }) ->
Protocol = enoise_protocol:from_name(Name),
FixK = fun(undefined) -> undefined;
@ -41,10 +41,9 @@ noise_interactive(V = #{ name := Name }) ->
noise_interactive(_Name, Protocol, Init, Resp, Messages, HSHash) ->
DH = enoise_protocol:dh(Protocol),
SecK = fun(undefined) -> undefined; (Sec) -> enoise_keypair:new(DH, Sec, undefined) end,
PubK = fun(undefined) -> undefined; (Pub) -> enoise_keypair:new(DH, Pub) end,
HSInit = fun(#{ e := E, s := S, rs := RS, prologue := PL }, R) ->
Opts = [{noise, Protocol}, {s, SecK(S)}, {e, SecK(E)}, {rs, PubK(RS)}, {prologue, PL}],
Opts = [{noise, Protocol}, {s, SecK(S)}, {e, SecK(E)}, {rs, RS}, {prologue, PL}],
enoise:handshake(Opts, R)
end,
{ok, InitHS} = HSInit(Init, initiator),
@ -149,12 +148,12 @@ noise_test_run_(Conf, SKP, CKP) ->
Protocol = enoise_protocol:from_name(Conf),
Port = 4556,
SrvOpts = [{echos, 2}, {cpub, CKP}],
SrvOpts = [{echos, 2}, {cpub, enoise_keypair:pubkey(CKP)}],
EchoSrv = enoise_utils:echo_srv_start(Port, Protocol, SKP, SrvOpts),
{ok, TcpSock} = gen_tcp:connect("localhost", Port, [{active, once}, binary, {reuseaddr, true}], 100),
Opts = [{noise, Protocol}, {s, CKP}] ++ [{rs, SKP} || enoise_utils:need_rs(initiator, Conf) ],
Opts = [{noise, Protocol}, {s, CKP}] ++ [{rs, enoise_keypair:pubkey(SKP)} || enoise_utils:need_rs(initiator, Conf) ],
{ok, EConn, _} = enoise:connect(TcpSock, Opts),
ok = enoise:send(EConn, <<"Hello World!">>),

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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ echo_srv(Port, Protocol, SKP, SrvOpts) ->
AcceptRes =
try
enoise:accept(TcpSock, Opts)
catch _:R -> gen_tcp:close(TcpSock), {error, {R, erlang:get_stacktrace()}} end,
catch _:R:S -> gen_tcp:close(TcpSock), {error, {R, S}} end,
gen_tcp:close(LSock),

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@ -114,9 +114,10 @@ parse_test_vectors(File) ->
%% Only test supported configurations
noise_test_filter(Tests0) ->
Tests1 = [ T || T = #{ name := Name } <- Tests0, supported(Name) ],
Tests1 = [ T || T = #{ protocol_name := Name } <- Tests0, supported(Name) ],
case length(Tests1) < length(Tests0) of
true -> ?debugFmt("WARNING: ~p test vectors are unsupported", [length(Tests0) - length(Tests1)]);
true -> ?debugFmt("WARNING: ~p test vectors out of ~p are unsupported",
[length(Tests0) - length(Tests1), length(Tests0)]);
false -> ok
end,
Tests1.

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