replace xrouter_clientd with xrouter_procd
This commit is contained in:
Irina Guberman
parent
207ec85f8c
commit
fd796440db
3
Makefile
3
Makefile
@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ compile:
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eqc_compile: compile
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erlc -o _build/default/lib/enacl/ebin eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl
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eqc_mini_compile: compile
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erlc -Dmini -o _build/default/lib/enacl/ebin eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl
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.PHONE: console
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console: compile
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$(REBAR) shell
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@ -2,11 +2,19 @@
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-include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl").
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-compile(export_all).
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%% -compile({parse_transform, eqc_parallelize}).
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-ifndef(mini).
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-compile({parse_transform, eqc_parallelize}).
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-define(FAULT(Arg1, Arg2), eqc:fault(Arg1, Arg2)).
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-define(FAULT_RATE(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3), eqc:fault_rate(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3)).
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-else.
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-define(FAULT(Arg1, Arg2), noop_fault(Arg1, Arg2)).
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-define(FAULT_RATE(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3), noop_fault_rate(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3)).
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-endif.
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z_fault(_Bad, Good) -> Good.
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z_fault_rate(_1, _2, Gen) -> Gen.
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noop_fault(_Bad, Good) -> Good.
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noop_fault_rate(_1, _2, Gen) -> Gen.
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non_byte_int() ->
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oneof([
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@ -18,7 +26,7 @@ g_iolist() ->
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?SIZED(Sz, g_iolist(Sz)).
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g_iolist(0) ->
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z_fault(
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?FAULT(
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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@ -26,7 +34,7 @@ g_iolist(0) ->
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]),
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return([]));
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g_iolist(N) ->
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z_fault(
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?FAULT(
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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@ -38,7 +46,7 @@ g_iolist(N) ->
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])).
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g_iodata() ->
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z_fault(
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?FAULT(
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oneof([elements([a,b,c]), real()]),
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oneof([binary(), g_iolist(), eqc_gen:largebinary(64*1024)])).
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@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ v_iodata(Structure) -> v_iolist(Structure).
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%% Generator for binaries of a given size with different properties and fault injection:
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g_binary(Sz) ->
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z_fault(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)).
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?FAULT(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)).
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g_binary_good(Sz) when Sz =< 32 -> binary(Sz);
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g_binary_good(Sz) -> eqc_gen:largebinary(Sz).
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@ -78,7 +86,7 @@ nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N).
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%% Generator of natural numbers
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g_nat() ->
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z_fault(g_nat_bad(), nat()).
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?FAULT(g_nat_bad(), nat()).
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g_nat_bad() ->
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oneof([
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@ -110,7 +118,7 @@ keypair_bad() ->
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end).
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keypair() ->
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z_fault(keypair_bad(), keypair_good()).
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?FAULT(keypair_bad(), keypair_good()).
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%% CRYPTO BOX
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%% ---------------------------
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@ -162,10 +170,10 @@ failure(X) -> {failure, X}.
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prop_box_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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@ -186,10 +194,10 @@ prop_box_correct() ->
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prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg)
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andalso nonce_valid(Nonce)
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@ -211,7 +219,7 @@ prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
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end).
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prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {z_fault_rate(1,40,g_iodata()), z_fault_rate(1,40,keypair())},
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {?FAULT_RATE(1,40,g_iodata()), ?FAULT_RATE(1,40,keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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@ -229,8 +237,8 @@ prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() ->
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prop_seal_box_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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@ -247,7 +255,7 @@ prop_seal_box_correct() ->
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%% PRECOMPUTATIONS
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beforenm_key() ->
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?LET([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()), z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())],
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?LET([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())],
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case keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2);
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@ -263,7 +271,7 @@ v_key(K) when is_binary(K) -> byte_size(K) == enacl:box_beforenm_bytes();
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v_key(_) -> false.
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prop_beforenm_correct() ->
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?FORALL([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()), z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())],
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?FORALL([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())],
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case keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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equals(enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2), enacl:box_beforenm(PK2, SK1));
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@ -276,9 +284,9 @@ prop_beforenm_correct() ->
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prop_afternm_correct() ->
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?FORALL([Msg, Nonce, Key],
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[z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, beforenm_key())],
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[?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, beforenm_key())],
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso v_key(Key) of
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true ->
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@ -329,7 +337,7 @@ sign_keypair_good() ->
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return(enacl:sign_keypair()).
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sign_keypair() ->
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z_fault(sign_keypair_bad(), sign_keypair_good()).
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?FAULT(sign_keypair_bad(), sign_keypair_good()).
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sign_keypair_public_valid(#{ public := Public })
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when is_binary(Public) ->
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@ -346,8 +354,8 @@ sign_keypair_valid(KP) ->
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prop_sign_detached() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
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true ->
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@ -362,8 +370,8 @@ prop_sign_detached() ->
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prop_sign() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
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true ->
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@ -407,10 +415,10 @@ signed_message_bad_d() ->
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{binary(), oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(Sz), byte_size(B) /= Sz)])}.
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signed_message(M) ->
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z_fault(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)).
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?FAULT(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)).
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signed_message_d(M) ->
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z_fault(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)).
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?FAULT(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)).
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signed_message_valid({valid, _}, _) -> true;
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signed_message_valid({invalid, _}, _) -> true;
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@ -478,7 +486,7 @@ secret_key_bad() ->
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?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= enacl:secretbox_key_size())]).
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secret_key() ->
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z_fault(secret_key_bad(), secret_key_good()).
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?FAULT(secret_key_bad(), secret_key_good()).
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secret_key_valid(SK) when is_binary(SK) ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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@ -501,9 +509,9 @@ secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
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prop_secretbox_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
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true ->
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@ -531,8 +539,8 @@ prop_secretbox_failure_integrity() ->
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prop_stream_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Len, Nonce, Key},
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{int(),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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case Len >= 0 andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
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true ->
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CipherStream = enacl:stream(Len, Nonce, Key),
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@ -547,9 +555,9 @@ xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
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%% prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
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%% ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
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%% {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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%% z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
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%% z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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%% {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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%% ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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%% ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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%% case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
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%% true ->
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%% Stream = enacl:stream(iolist_size(Msg), Nonce, Key),
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@ -566,8 +574,8 @@ xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
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%% CRYPTO AUTH
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prop_auth_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Key},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
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true ->
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Authenticator = enacl:auth(Msg, Key),
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@ -592,7 +600,7 @@ authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) ->
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binary(enacl:auth_size()).
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authenticator(Msg, Key) ->
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z_fault(authenticator_bad(), authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
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?FAULT(authenticator_bad(), authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
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authenticator_valid({valid, _}) -> true;
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authenticator_valid({invalid, _}) -> true;
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@ -600,8 +608,8 @@ authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
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prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Key},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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?FORALL(Authenticator, authenticator(Msg, Key),
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
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true ->
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@ -618,8 +626,8 @@ prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
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%% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH
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prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Key},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
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true ->
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Authenticator = enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key),
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@ -644,7 +652,7 @@ ot_authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) ->
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binary(enacl:auth_size()).
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ot_authenticator(Msg, Key) ->
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z_fault(ot_authenticator_bad(), ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
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?FAULT(ot_authenticator_bad(), ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
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ot_authenticator_valid({valid, _}) -> true;
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ot_authenticator_valid({invalid, _}) -> true;
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@ -652,8 +660,8 @@ ot_authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
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prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Key},
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{z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
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?FORALL(Authenticator, ot_authenticator(Msg, Key),
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
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true ->
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@ -710,7 +718,7 @@ verify_pair_good(Sz) ->
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?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {binary(Sz), binary(Sz)}, X /= Y)]).
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verify_pair(Sz) ->
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z_fault(verify_pair_bad(Sz), verify_pair_good(Sz)).
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?FAULT(verify_pair_bad(Sz), verify_pair_good(Sz)).
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verify_pair_valid(Sz, X, Y) ->
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byte_size(X) == Sz andalso byte_size(Y) == Sz.
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