diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 61eb843..3b5f540 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ compile: eqc_compile: compile erlc -o _build/default/lib/enacl/ebin eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl +eqc_mini_compile: compile + erlc -Dmini -o _build/default/lib/enacl/ebin eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl + .PHONE: console console: compile $(REBAR) shell diff --git a/eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl b/eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl index 430939d..e4efbfd 100644 --- a/eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl +++ b/eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl @@ -2,11 +2,19 @@ -include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl"). -compile(export_all). -%% -compile({parse_transform, eqc_parallelize}). +-ifndef(mini). +-compile({parse_transform, eqc_parallelize}). +-define(FAULT(Arg1, Arg2), eqc:fault(Arg1, Arg2)). +-define(FAULT_RATE(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3), eqc:fault_rate(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3)). +-else. +-define(FAULT(Arg1, Arg2), noop_fault(Arg1, Arg2)). +-define(FAULT_RATE(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3), noop_fault_rate(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3)). +-endif. -z_fault(_Bad, Good) -> Good. -z_fault_rate(_1, _2, Gen) -> Gen. +noop_fault(_Bad, Good) -> Good. + +noop_fault_rate(_1, _2, Gen) -> Gen. non_byte_int() -> oneof([ @@ -18,7 +26,7 @@ g_iolist() -> ?SIZED(Sz, g_iolist(Sz)). g_iolist(0) -> - z_fault( + ?FAULT( oneof([ elements([a,b,c]), real(), @@ -26,7 +34,7 @@ g_iolist(0) -> ]), return([])); g_iolist(N) -> - z_fault( + ?FAULT( oneof([ elements([a,b,c]), real(), @@ -38,7 +46,7 @@ g_iolist(N) -> ])). g_iodata() -> - z_fault( + ?FAULT( oneof([elements([a,b,c]), real()]), oneof([binary(), g_iolist(), eqc_gen:largebinary(64*1024)])). @@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ v_iodata(Structure) -> v_iolist(Structure). %% Generator for binaries of a given size with different properties and fault injection: g_binary(Sz) -> - z_fault(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)). + ?FAULT(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)). g_binary_good(Sz) when Sz =< 32 -> binary(Sz); g_binary_good(Sz) -> eqc_gen:largebinary(Sz). @@ -78,7 +86,7 @@ nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N). %% Generator of natural numbers g_nat() -> - z_fault(g_nat_bad(), nat()). + ?FAULT(g_nat_bad(), nat()). g_nat_bad() -> oneof([ @@ -110,7 +118,7 @@ keypair_bad() -> end). keypair() -> - z_fault(keypair_bad(), keypair_good()). + ?FAULT(keypair_bad(), keypair_good()). %% CRYPTO BOX %% --------------------------- @@ -162,10 +170,10 @@ failure(X) -> {failure, X}. prop_box_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of true -> @@ -186,10 +194,10 @@ prop_box_correct() -> prop_box_failure_integrity() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) @@ -211,7 +219,7 @@ prop_box_failure_integrity() -> end). prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() -> - ?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {z_fault_rate(1,40,g_iodata()), z_fault_rate(1,40,keypair())}, + ?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {?FAULT_RATE(1,40,g_iodata()), ?FAULT_RATE(1,40,keypair())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of true -> @@ -229,8 +237,8 @@ prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() -> prop_seal_box_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of true -> @@ -247,7 +255,7 @@ prop_seal_box_correct() -> %% PRECOMPUTATIONS beforenm_key() -> - ?LET([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()), z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())], + ?LET([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())], case keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of true -> enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2); @@ -263,7 +271,7 @@ v_key(K) when is_binary(K) -> byte_size(K) == enacl:box_beforenm_bytes(); v_key(_) -> false. prop_beforenm_correct() -> - ?FORALL([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()), z_fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())], + ?FORALL([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())], case keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of true -> equals(enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2), enacl:box_beforenm(PK2, SK1)); @@ -276,9 +284,9 @@ prop_beforenm_correct() -> prop_afternm_correct() -> ?FORALL([Msg, Nonce, Key], - [z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, beforenm_key())], + [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, beforenm_key())], begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso v_key(Key) of true -> @@ -329,7 +337,7 @@ sign_keypair_good() -> return(enacl:sign_keypair()). sign_keypair() -> - z_fault(sign_keypair_bad(), sign_keypair_good()). + ?FAULT(sign_keypair_bad(), sign_keypair_good()). sign_keypair_public_valid(#{ public := Public }) when is_binary(Public) -> @@ -346,8 +354,8 @@ sign_keypair_valid(KP) -> prop_sign_detached() -> ?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, sign_keypair())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of true -> @@ -362,8 +370,8 @@ prop_sign_detached() -> prop_sign() -> ?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, sign_keypair())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of true -> @@ -407,10 +415,10 @@ signed_message_bad_d() -> {binary(), oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(Sz), byte_size(B) /= Sz)])}. signed_message(M) -> - z_fault(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)). + ?FAULT(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)). signed_message_d(M) -> - z_fault(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)). + ?FAULT(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)). signed_message_valid({valid, _}, _) -> true; signed_message_valid({invalid, _}, _) -> true; @@ -478,7 +486,7 @@ secret_key_bad() -> ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= enacl:secretbox_key_size())]). secret_key() -> - z_fault(secret_key_bad(), secret_key_good()). + ?FAULT(secret_key_bad(), secret_key_good()). secret_key_valid(SK) when is_binary(SK) -> Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(), @@ -501,9 +509,9 @@ secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) -> prop_secretbox_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, begin case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of true -> @@ -531,8 +539,8 @@ prop_secretbox_failure_integrity() -> prop_stream_correct() -> ?FORALL({Len, Nonce, Key}, {int(), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, case Len >= 0 andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of true -> CipherStream = enacl:stream(Len, Nonce, Key), @@ -547,9 +555,9 @@ xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> []. %% prop_stream_xor_correct() -> %% ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, -%% {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), -%% z_fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()), -%% z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, +%% {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), +%% ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()), +%% ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, %% case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of %% true -> %% Stream = enacl:stream(iolist_size(Msg), Nonce, Key), @@ -566,8 +574,8 @@ xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> []. %% CRYPTO AUTH prop_auth_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Key}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of true -> Authenticator = enacl:auth(Msg, Key), @@ -592,7 +600,7 @@ authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) -> binary(enacl:auth_size()). authenticator(Msg, Key) -> - z_fault(authenticator_bad(), authenticator_good(Msg, Key)). + ?FAULT(authenticator_bad(), authenticator_good(Msg, Key)). authenticator_valid({valid, _}) -> true; authenticator_valid({invalid, _}) -> true; @@ -600,8 +608,8 @@ authenticator_valid(_) -> false. prop_auth_verify_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Key}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, ?FORALL(Authenticator, authenticator(Msg, Key), case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of true -> @@ -618,8 +626,8 @@ prop_auth_verify_correct() -> %% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH prop_onetimeauth_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Key}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of true -> Authenticator = enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key), @@ -644,7 +652,7 @@ ot_authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) -> binary(enacl:auth_size()). ot_authenticator(Msg, Key) -> - z_fault(ot_authenticator_bad(), ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key)). + ?FAULT(ot_authenticator_bad(), ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key)). ot_authenticator_valid({valid, _}) -> true; ot_authenticator_valid({invalid, _}) -> true; @@ -652,8 +660,8 @@ ot_authenticator_valid(_) -> false. prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() -> ?FORALL({Msg, Key}, - {z_fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()), - z_fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())}, + {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()), + ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())}, ?FORALL(Authenticator, ot_authenticator(Msg, Key), case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of true -> @@ -710,7 +718,7 @@ verify_pair_good(Sz) -> ?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {binary(Sz), binary(Sz)}, X /= Y)]). verify_pair(Sz) -> - z_fault(verify_pair_bad(Sz), verify_pair_good(Sz)). + ?FAULT(verify_pair_bad(Sz), verify_pair_good(Sz)). verify_pair_valid(Sz, X, Y) -> byte_size(X) == Sz andalso byte_size(Y) == Sz.