Move functions around. Mark untested functionality.
A lot of people who pushed functions they missed have not pushed any kind of test cases for them. To make sure we have test coverage, I've marked the functions we have under test and the functions we are still missing tests for.
This commit is contained in:
Jesper Louis Andersen
+124
-128
@@ -124,7 +124,11 @@ keypair() ->
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%% CRYPTO BOX
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%% ---------------------------
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%% * box/4
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%% * box_open/4
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%% * box_beforenm/2
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%% * box_afternm/3
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%% * box_open_afternm/3
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keypair_valid(PK, SK) when is_binary(PK), is_binary(SK) ->
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PKBytes = enacl:box_public_key_bytes(),
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SKBytes = enacl:box_secret_key_bytes(),
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@@ -220,40 +224,6 @@ prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
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end
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end).
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prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {?FAULT_RATE(1,40,g_iodata()), ?FAULT_RATE(1,40,keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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CT = enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK1),
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Err = enacl:box_seal_open([<<"x">>, CT], PK1, SK1),
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equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
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false ->
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case box_seal(Msg, PK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res ->
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failure(box_seal_open(Res, PK1, SK1))
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end
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end
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end).
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prop_seal_box_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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SealedCipherText = enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK1),
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{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_seal_open(SealedCipherText, PK1, SK1),
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equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
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false ->
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case box_seal(Msg, PK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res -> failure(box_seal_open(Res, PK1, SK1))
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end
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end
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end).
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%% PRECOMPUTATIONS
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beforenm_key() ->
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@@ -456,67 +426,46 @@ prop_sign_open() ->
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:sign_open(SignMsg, PK) end)
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end)).
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%% PWHASH
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%% -------------------------------
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pwhash(Passwd, Salt) ->
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try
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enacl:pwhash(Passwd, Salt)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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pwhash_str(Passwd) ->
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try
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enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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pwhash_str_verify(PasswdHash, Passwd) ->
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try
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enacl:pwhash_str_verify(PasswdHash, Passwd)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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prop_pwhash_str_verify() ->
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?FORALL({Passwd},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata())},
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prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {?FAULT_RATE(1,40,g_iodata()), ?FAULT_RATE(1,40,keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Passwd) of
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true ->
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{ok, Ascii} = enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd),
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S = enacl:pwhash_str_verify(Ascii, Passwd),
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equals(S, true);
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false ->
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd) end),
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:pwhash_str_verify("", Passwd) end)
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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CT = enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK1),
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Err = enacl:box_seal_open([<<"x">>, CT], PK1, SK1),
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equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
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false ->
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case box_seal(Msg, PK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res ->
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failure(box_seal_open(Res, PK1, SK1))
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end
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end
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end).
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end).
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prop_seal_box_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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SealedCipherText = enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK1),
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{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_seal_open(SealedCipherText, PK1, SK1),
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equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
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false ->
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case box_seal(Msg, PK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res -> failure(box_seal_open(Res, PK1, SK1))
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end
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end
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end).
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%% CRYPTO SECRET BOX
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%% -------------------------------
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%% Note: key sizes are the same in a lot of situations, so we can use the same generator
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%% for keys in many locations.
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key_sz(Sz) ->
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equals(enacl:secretbox_key_size(), Sz).
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%% prop_key_sizes() ->
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%% conjunction([{secret, key_sz(enacl:secretbox_key_size())},
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%% {stream, key_sz(enacl:stream_key_size())},
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%% {auth, key_sz(enacl:auth_key_size())},
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%% {onetimeauth, key_sz(enacl:onetime_auth_key_size())}]).
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nonce_sz(Sz) ->
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equals(enacl:secretbox_nonce_size(), Sz).
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%% prop_nonce_sizes() ->
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%% conjunction([{secret, nonce_sz(enacl:secretbox_nonce_size())},
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%% {stream, nonce_sz(enacl:stream_nonce_size())}]).
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * secretbox/3
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%% * secretbo_open/3
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secret_key_good() ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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binary(Sz).
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@@ -535,17 +484,13 @@ secret_key_valid(SK) when is_binary(SK) ->
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secret_key_valid(_SK) -> false.
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secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
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try
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enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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try enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key)
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catch error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
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try
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enacl:secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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try enacl:secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key)
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catch error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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prop_secretbox_correct() ->
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@@ -576,7 +521,32 @@ prop_secretbox_failure_integrity() ->
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equals(Err, {error, failed_verification})
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end).
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%% AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt/4,
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%% * aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt/4,
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prop_aead_chacha20poly1305() ->
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?FORALL({Key, Msg, AD, Nonce},
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{binary(32), binary(), ?LET(ADBytes, choose(0,16), binary(ADBytes)), largeint()},
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begin
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EncryptMsg = enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, Msg),
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equals(enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, EncryptMsg), Msg)
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end).
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prop_aead_chacha20poly1305_fail() ->
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?FORALL({Key, Msg, AD, Nonce},
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{binary(32), binary(), ?LET(ADBytes, choose(0,16), binary(ADBytes)), largeint()},
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begin
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EncryptMsg = enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, Msg),
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case enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, <<0:8, EncryptMsg/binary>>) of
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{error, _} -> true;
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_ -> false
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end
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end).
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%% CRYPTO STREAM
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * stream/3
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prop_stream_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Len, Nonce, Key},
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{int(),
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@@ -613,6 +583,9 @@ xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
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%% end).
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%% CRYPTO AUTH
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * auth/2
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%% * auth_verify/3
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prop_auth_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Key},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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@@ -665,6 +638,9 @@ prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
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end)).
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%% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * onetime_auth/2
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%% * onetime_auth_verify/3
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prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Key},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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@@ -716,7 +692,48 @@ prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:onetime_auth_verify(Authenticator, Msg, Key) end)
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end)).
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%% HASHING
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%% PWHASH
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%% -------------------------------
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%% * pwhash/2
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%% * pwhash_str/1
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%% * pwhash_str_verify/2
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pwhash(Passwd, Salt) ->
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try
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enacl:pwhash(Passwd, Salt)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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pwhash_str(Passwd) ->
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try
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enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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pwhash_str_verify(PasswdHash, Passwd) ->
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try
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enacl:pwhash_str_verify(PasswdHash, Passwd)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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prop_pwhash_str_verify() ->
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?FORALL({Passwd},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Passwd) of
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true ->
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{ok, Ascii} = enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd),
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S = enacl:pwhash_str_verify(Ascii, Passwd),
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equals(S, true);
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false ->
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd) end),
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:pwhash_str_verify("", Passwd) end)
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end
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end).
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%% SUBTLE HASHING
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%% ---------------------------
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diff_pair() ->
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?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_iodata(), g_iodata()},
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@@ -743,7 +760,8 @@ prop_crypto_hash_neq() ->
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%% STRING COMPARISON
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%% -------------------------
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%% * verify_16/2,
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%% * verify_32/2
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verify_pair_bad(Sz) ->
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?LET(X, elements([fst, snd]),
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case X of
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@@ -793,6 +811,8 @@ prop_verify_32() ->
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end).
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%% RANDOMBYTES
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * randombytes/1
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prop_randombytes() ->
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?FORALL(X, g_nat(),
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case is_nat(X) of
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@@ -808,12 +828,8 @@ prop_randombytes() ->
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end
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end).
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%% SCRAMBLING
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prop_scramble_block() ->
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?FORALL({Block, Key}, {binary(16), eqc_gen:largebinary(32)},
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is_binary(enacl_ext:scramble_block_16(Block, Key))).
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%% HELPERS
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%% INTERNAL FUNCTIONS
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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badargs(Thunk) ->
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try
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Thunk(),
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@@ -822,26 +838,6 @@ badargs(Thunk) ->
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error:badarg -> true
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end.
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%% AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305
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prop_aead_chacha20poly1305() ->
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?FORALL({Key, Msg, AD, Nonce},
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{binary(32), binary(), ?LET(ADBytes, choose(0,16), binary(ADBytes)), largeint()},
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begin
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EncryptMsg = enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, Msg),
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equals(enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, EncryptMsg), Msg)
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end).
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prop_aead_chacha20poly1305_fail() ->
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?FORALL({Key, Msg, AD, Nonce},
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{binary(32), binary(), ?LET(ADBytes, choose(0,16), binary(ADBytes)), largeint()},
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begin
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EncryptMsg = enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, Msg),
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case enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, <<0:8, EncryptMsg/binary>>) of
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{error, _} -> true;
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_ -> false
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end
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end).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% Joel Test Blobs
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@@ -22,3 +22,7 @@ prop_shared_secret() ->
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equals(Alice, Bob)
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end).
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prop_scramble_block() ->
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?FORALL({Block, Key}, {binary(16), eqc_gen:largebinary(32)},
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is_binary(enacl_ext:scramble_block_16(Block, Key))).
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