3b9bc848e9
A lot of people who pushed functions they missed have not pushed any kind of test cases for them. To make sure we have test coverage, I've marked the functions we have under test and the functions we are still missing tests for.
869 lines
27 KiB
Erlang
869 lines
27 KiB
Erlang
-module(enacl_eqc).
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-include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl").
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-compile(export_all).
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-ifndef(mini).
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-compile({parse_transform, eqc_parallelize}).
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-define(FAULT(Arg1, Arg2), fault(Arg1, Arg2)).
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-define(FAULT_RATE(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3), fault_rate(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3)).
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-else.
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-define(FAULT(Arg1, Arg2), noop_fault(Arg1, Arg2)).
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-define(FAULT_RATE(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3), noop_fault_rate(Arg1, Arg2, Arg3)).
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-endif.
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start()->
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eqc:module(?MODULE).
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noop_fault(_Bad, Good) -> Good.
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noop_fault_rate(_1, _2, Gen) -> Gen.
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non_byte_int() ->
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oneof([
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?LET(N, nat(), -(N+1)),
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?LET(N, nat(), N+256)
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]).
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g_iolist() ->
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?SIZED(Sz, g_iolist(Sz)).
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g_iolist(0) ->
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?FAULT(
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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non_byte_int()
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]),
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return([]));
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g_iolist(N) ->
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?FAULT(
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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non_byte_int()
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]),
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frequency([
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{1, g_iolist(0)},
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{N, ?LAZY(list(oneof([char(), binary(), g_iolist(N div 4)])))}
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])).
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g_iodata() ->
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?FAULT(
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oneof([elements([a,b,c]), real()]),
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oneof([binary(), g_iolist(), eqc_gen:largebinary(64*1024)])).
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v_iolist([]) -> true;
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v_iolist([B|Xs]) when is_binary(B) -> v_iolist(Xs);
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v_iolist([C|Xs]) when is_integer(C), C >= 0, C < 256 -> v_iolist(Xs);
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v_iolist([L|Xs]) when is_list(L) ->
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v_iolist(L) andalso v_iolist(Xs);
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v_iolist(_) -> false.
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v_iodata(B) when is_binary(B) -> true;
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v_iodata(Structure) -> v_iolist(Structure).
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%% Generator for binaries of a given size with different properties and fault injection:
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g_binary(Sz) ->
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?FAULT(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)).
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g_binary_good(Sz) when Sz =< 32 -> binary(Sz);
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g_binary_good(Sz) -> eqc_gen:largebinary(Sz).
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g_binary_bad(Sz) ->
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frequency([
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{5, ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)},
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{1, elements([a, b])},
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{1, int()},
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{1, g_iodata()}
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]).
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v_binary(Sz, N) when is_binary(N) ->
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byte_size(N) == Sz;
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v_binary(_, _) -> false.
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%% Typical generators based on the binaries
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nonce() -> g_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size()).
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nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N).
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%% Generator of natural numbers
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g_nat() ->
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?FAULT(g_nat_bad(), nat()).
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g_nat_bad() ->
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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binary(),
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?LET(X, nat(), -X)
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]).
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is_nat(N) when is_integer(N), N >= 0 -> true;
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is_nat(_) -> false.
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keypair_good() ->
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK} = enacl:box_keypair(),
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{PK, SK}.
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keypair_bad() ->
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?LET(X, elements([pk, sk]),
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begin
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK} = enacl:box_keypair(),
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case X of
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pk ->
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PKBytes = enacl:box_public_key_bytes(),
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{oneof([return(a), nat(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= PKBytes)]), SK};
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sk ->
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SKBytes = enacl:box_secret_key_bytes(),
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{PK, oneof([return(a), nat(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= SKBytes)])}
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end
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end).
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keypair() ->
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?FAULT(keypair_bad(), keypair_good()).
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%% CRYPTO BOX
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%% ---------------------------
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%% * box/4
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%% * box_open/4
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%% * box_beforenm/2
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%% * box_afternm/3
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%% * box_open_afternm/3
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keypair_valid(PK, SK) when is_binary(PK), is_binary(SK) ->
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PKBytes = enacl:box_public_key_bytes(),
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SKBytes = enacl:box_secret_key_bytes(),
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byte_size(PK) == PKBytes andalso byte_size(SK) == SKBytes;
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keypair_valid(_PK, _SK) -> false.
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prop_box_keypair() ->
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?FORALL(_X, return(dummy),
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ok_box_keypair(enacl:box_keypair())).
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ok_box_keypair(#{ public := _, secret := _}) -> true;
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ok_box_keypair(_) -> false.
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box(Msg, Nonce , PK, SK) ->
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try
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enacl:box(Msg, Nonce, PK, SK)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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box_seal(Msg, PK) ->
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try
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enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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box_seal_open(Cph, PK, SK) ->
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try
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enacl:box_seal_open(Cph, PK, SK)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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box_open(CphText, Nonce, PK, SK) ->
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try
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enacl:box_open(CphText, Nonce, PK, SK)
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catch
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error:badarg -> badarg
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end.
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failure(badarg) -> true;
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failure({error, failed_verification}) -> true;
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failure(X) -> {failure, X}.
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prop_box_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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Key = enacl:box_beforenm(PK2, SK1),
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Key = enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2),
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CipherText = enacl:box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1),
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CipherText = enacl:box_afternm(Msg, Nonce, Key),
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{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_open(CipherText, Nonce, PK1, SK2),
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{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_open_afternm(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
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equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
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false ->
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case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res -> failure(box_open(Res, Nonce, PK1, SK2))
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end
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end
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end).
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prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg)
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andalso nonce_valid(Nonce)
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andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1)
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andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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Key = enacl:box_beforenm(PK2, SK1),
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CipherText = enacl:box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1),
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Err = enacl:box_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, PK1, SK2),
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Err = enacl:box_open_afternm([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, Key),
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equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
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false ->
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case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res ->
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failure(box_open(Res, Nonce, PK1, SK2))
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end
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end
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end).
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%% PRECOMPUTATIONS
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beforenm_key() ->
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?LET([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())],
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case keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2);
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false ->
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:box_beforenm_bytes())
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])
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end).
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v_key(K) when is_binary(K) -> byte_size(K) == enacl:box_beforenm_bytes();
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v_key(_) -> false.
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prop_beforenm_correct() ->
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?FORALL([{PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}], [?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair()), ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())],
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case keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
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true ->
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equals(enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2), enacl:box_beforenm(PK2, SK1));
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false ->
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badargs(fun() ->
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K = enacl:box_beforenm(PK1, SK2),
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K = enacl:box_beforenm(PK2, SK1)
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end)
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end).
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prop_afternm_correct() ->
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?FORALL([Msg, Nonce, Key],
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[?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, beforenm_key())],
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso v_key(Key) of
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true ->
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CipherText = enacl:box_afternm(Msg, Nonce, Key),
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equals({ok, iolist_to_binary(Msg)}, enacl:box_open_afternm(CipherText, Nonce, Key));
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false ->
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try enacl:box_afternm(Msg, Nonce, Key) of
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CipherText ->
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try enacl:box_open_afternm(CipherText, Nonce, Key) of
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{ok, _M} -> false;
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{error, failed_validation} -> false
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catch
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error:badarg -> true
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end
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catch
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error:badarg -> true
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end
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end
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end).
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%% SIGNATURES
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%% ----------
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prop_sign_keypair() ->
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?FORALL(_D, return(dummy),
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begin
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#{ public := _, secret := _ } = enacl:sign_keypair(),
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true
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end).
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sign_keypair_bad() ->
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?LET(X, elements([pk, sk]),
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begin
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KP = enacl:sign_keypair(),
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case X of
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pk ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_public_size(),
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?LET(Wrong, oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)]),
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KP#{ public := Wrong });
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sk ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_secret_size(),
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?LET(Wrong, oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)]),
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KP#{ secret := Wrong })
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end
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end).
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sign_keypair_good() ->
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return(enacl:sign_keypair()).
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sign_keypair() ->
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?FAULT(sign_keypair_bad(), sign_keypair_good()).
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sign_keypair_public_valid(#{ public := Public })
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when is_binary(Public) ->
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byte_size(Public) == enacl:sign_keypair_public_size();
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sign_keypair_public_valid(_) -> false.
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sign_keypair_secret_valid(#{ secret := Secret })
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when is_binary(Secret) ->
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byte_size(Secret) == enacl:sign_keypair_secret_size();
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sign_keypair_secret_valid(_) -> false.
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sign_keypair_valid(KP) ->
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sign_keypair_public_valid(KP) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KP).
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prop_sign_detached() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
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true ->
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#{ secret := Secret } = KeyPair,
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enacl:sign_detached(Msg, Secret),
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true;
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false ->
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#{ secret := Secret } = KeyPair,
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:sign_detached(Msg, Secret) end)
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end
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end).
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prop_sign() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
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true ->
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#{ secret := Secret } = KeyPair,
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enacl:sign(Msg, Secret),
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true;
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false ->
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#{ secret := Secret } = KeyPair,
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:sign(Msg, Secret) end)
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end
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end).
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signed_message_good(M) ->
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK} = enacl:sign_keypair(),
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SM = enacl:sign(M, SK),
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frequency([
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{3, return({{valid, SM}, PK})},
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{1, ?LET(X, elements([sm, pk]),
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case X of
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sm -> {{invalid, binary(byte_size(SM))}, PK};
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pk -> {{invalid, SM}, binary(byte_size(PK))}
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end)}]).
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signed_message_good_d(M) ->
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK} = enacl:sign_keypair(),
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Sig = enacl:sign_detached(M, SK),
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frequency([
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{3, return({{valid, Sig}, PK})},
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{1, ?LET(X, elements([sm, pk]),
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case X of
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sm -> {{invalid, binary(byte_size(Sig))}, PK};
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pk -> {{invalid, Sig}, binary(byte_size(PK))}
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end)}]).
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signed_message_bad() ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_public_size(),
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{binary(), oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(Sz), byte_size(B) /= Sz)])}.
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signed_message_bad_d() ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_public_size(),
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{binary(), oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(Sz), byte_size(B) /= Sz)])}.
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signed_message(M) ->
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?FAULT(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)).
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signed_message_d(M) ->
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?FAULT(signed_message_bad(), signed_message_good(M)).
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signed_message_valid({valid, _}, _) -> true;
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signed_message_valid({invalid, _}, _) -> true;
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signed_message_valid(_, _) -> false.
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prop_sign_detached_open() ->
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?FORALL(Msg, g_iodata(),
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?FORALL({SignMsg, PK}, signed_message_d(Msg),
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso signed_message_valid(SignMsg, PK) of
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true ->
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case SignMsg of
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{valid, Sig} ->
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equals({ok, Msg}, enacl:sign_verify_detached(Sig, Msg, PK));
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{invalid, Sig} ->
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equals({error, failed_verification}, enacl:sign_verify_detached(Sig, Msg, PK))
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end;
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false ->
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:sign_verify_detached(SignMsg, Msg, PK) end)
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end)).
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prop_sign_open() ->
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?FORALL(Msg, g_iodata(),
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?FORALL({SignMsg, PK}, signed_message(Msg),
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso signed_message_valid(SignMsg, PK) of
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true ->
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case SignMsg of
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{valid, SM} ->
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equals({ok, iolist_to_binary(Msg)}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK));
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{invalid, SM} ->
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equals({error, failed_verification}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK))
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end;
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false ->
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badargs(fun() -> enacl:sign_open(SignMsg, PK) end)
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end)).
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prop_seal_box_failure_integrity() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}}, {?FAULT_RATE(1,40,g_iodata()), ?FAULT_RATE(1,40,keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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CT = enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK1),
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Err = enacl:box_seal_open([<<"x">>, CT], PK1, SK1),
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equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
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false ->
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case box_seal(Msg, PK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res ->
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failure(box_seal_open(Res, PK1, SK1))
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end
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end
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end).
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prop_seal_box_correct() ->
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?FORALL({Msg, {PK1, SK1}},
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{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
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?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, keypair())},
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begin
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) of
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true ->
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SealedCipherText = enacl:box_seal(Msg, PK1),
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{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_seal_open(SealedCipherText, PK1, SK1),
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equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
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false ->
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case box_seal(Msg, PK1) of
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badarg -> true;
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Res -> failure(box_seal_open(Res, PK1, SK1))
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end
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end
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end).
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%% CRYPTO SECRET BOX
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * secretbox/3
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%% * secretbo_open/3
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secret_key_good() ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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binary(Sz).
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secret_key_bad() ->
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oneof([return(a),
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nat(),
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?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= enacl:secretbox_key_size())]).
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secret_key() ->
|
|
?FAULT(secret_key_bad(), secret_key_good()).
|
|
|
|
secret_key_valid(SK) when is_binary(SK) ->
|
|
Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
|
|
byte_size(SK) == Sz;
|
|
secret_key_valid(_SK) -> false.
|
|
|
|
secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
|
|
try enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key)
|
|
catch error:badarg -> badarg
|
|
end.
|
|
|
|
secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
|
|
try enacl:secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key)
|
|
catch error:badarg -> badarg
|
|
end.
|
|
|
|
prop_secretbox_correct() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
|
|
{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
begin
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
CipherText = enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key),
|
|
{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:secretbox_open(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
|
|
equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
|
|
false ->
|
|
case secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key) of
|
|
badarg -> true;
|
|
Res ->
|
|
failure(secretbox_open(Res, Nonce, Key))
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
prop_secretbox_failure_integrity() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, {g_iodata(), nonce(), secret_key()},
|
|
begin
|
|
CipherText = enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key),
|
|
Err = enacl:secretbox_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, Key),
|
|
equals(Err, {error, failed_verification})
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
%% AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305
|
|
%% ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
%% * aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt/4,
|
|
%% * aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt/4,
|
|
prop_aead_chacha20poly1305() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Key, Msg, AD, Nonce},
|
|
{binary(32), binary(), ?LET(ADBytes, choose(0,16), binary(ADBytes)), largeint()},
|
|
begin
|
|
EncryptMsg = enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, Msg),
|
|
equals(enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, EncryptMsg), Msg)
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
prop_aead_chacha20poly1305_fail() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Key, Msg, AD, Nonce},
|
|
{binary(32), binary(), ?LET(ADBytes, choose(0,16), binary(ADBytes)), largeint()},
|
|
begin
|
|
EncryptMsg = enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, Msg),
|
|
case enacl:aead_chacha20poly1305_decrypt(Key, Nonce, AD, <<0:8, EncryptMsg/binary>>) of
|
|
{error, _} -> true;
|
|
_ -> false
|
|
end
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
%% CRYPTO STREAM
|
|
%% ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
%% * stream/3
|
|
prop_stream_correct() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Len, Nonce, Key},
|
|
{int(),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
case Len >= 0 andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
CipherStream = enacl:stream(Len, Nonce, Key),
|
|
equals(Len, byte_size(CipherStream));
|
|
false ->
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:stream(Len, Nonce, Key) end)
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
xor_bytes(<<A, As/binary>>, <<B, Bs/binary>>) ->
|
|
[A bxor B | xor_bytes(As, Bs)];
|
|
xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
|
|
|
|
%% prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
|
|
%% ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
|
|
%% {?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
|
|
%% ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, nonce()),
|
|
%% ?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
%% case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
|
%% true ->
|
|
%% Stream = enacl:stream(iolist_size(Msg), Nonce, Key),
|
|
%% CipherText = enacl:stream_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key),
|
|
%% StreamXor = enacl:stream_xor(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
|
|
%% conjunction([
|
|
%% {'xor', equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), StreamXor)},
|
|
%% {stream, equals(iolist_to_binary(xor_bytes(Stream, iolist_to_binary(Msg))), CipherText)}
|
|
%% ]);
|
|
%% false ->
|
|
%% badargs(fun() -> enacl:stream_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key) end)
|
|
%% end).
|
|
|
|
%% CRYPTO AUTH
|
|
%% ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
%% * auth/2
|
|
%% * auth_verify/3
|
|
prop_auth_correct() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
|
{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
Authenticator = enacl:auth(Msg, Key),
|
|
equals(Authenticator, enacl:auth(Msg, Key));
|
|
false ->
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:auth(Msg, Key) end)
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
authenticator_bad() ->
|
|
oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:auth_size())]).
|
|
|
|
authenticator_good(Msg, Key) when is_binary(Key) ->
|
|
Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso byte_size(Key) == Sz of
|
|
true ->
|
|
frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:auth_size())})},
|
|
{3, return({valid, enacl:auth(Msg, Key)})}]);
|
|
false ->
|
|
binary(enacl:auth_size())
|
|
end;
|
|
authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) ->
|
|
binary(enacl:auth_size()).
|
|
|
|
authenticator(Msg, Key) ->
|
|
?FAULT(authenticator_bad(), authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
|
|
|
|
authenticator_valid({valid, _}) -> true;
|
|
authenticator_valid({invalid, _}) -> true;
|
|
authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
|
|
|
|
prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
|
{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
?FORALL(Authenticator, authenticator(Msg, Key),
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
case Authenticator of
|
|
{valid, A} ->
|
|
equals(true, enacl:auth_verify(A, Msg, Key));
|
|
{invalid, A} ->
|
|
equals(false, enacl:auth_verify(A, Msg, Key))
|
|
end;
|
|
false ->
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:auth_verify(Authenticator, Msg, Key) end)
|
|
end)).
|
|
|
|
%% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH
|
|
%% ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
%% * onetime_auth/2
|
|
%% * onetime_auth_verify/3
|
|
prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
|
{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
Authenticator = enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key),
|
|
equals(Authenticator, enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key));
|
|
false ->
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key) end)
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
ot_authenticator_bad() ->
|
|
oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:onetime_auth_size())]).
|
|
|
|
ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key) when is_binary(Key) ->
|
|
Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso byte_size(Key) == Sz of
|
|
true ->
|
|
frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:onetime_auth_size())})},
|
|
{3, return({valid, enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key)})}]);
|
|
false ->
|
|
binary(enacl:onetime_auth_size())
|
|
end;
|
|
ot_authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) ->
|
|
binary(enacl:auth_size()).
|
|
|
|
ot_authenticator(Msg, Key) ->
|
|
?FAULT(ot_authenticator_bad(), ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
|
|
|
|
ot_authenticator_valid({valid, _}) -> true;
|
|
ot_authenticator_valid({invalid, _}) -> true;
|
|
ot_authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
|
|
|
|
prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
|
{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata()),
|
|
?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
|
?FORALL(Authenticator, ot_authenticator(Msg, Key),
|
|
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
case Authenticator of
|
|
{valid, A} ->
|
|
equals(true, enacl:onetime_auth_verify(A, Msg, Key));
|
|
{invalid, A} ->
|
|
equals(false, enacl:onetime_auth_verify(A, Msg, Key))
|
|
end;
|
|
false ->
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:onetime_auth_verify(Authenticator, Msg, Key) end)
|
|
end)).
|
|
|
|
%% PWHASH
|
|
%% -------------------------------
|
|
%% * pwhash/2
|
|
%% * pwhash_str/1
|
|
%% * pwhash_str_verify/2
|
|
pwhash(Passwd, Salt) ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:pwhash(Passwd, Salt)
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> badarg
|
|
end.
|
|
|
|
pwhash_str(Passwd) ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd)
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> badarg
|
|
end.
|
|
|
|
pwhash_str_verify(PasswdHash, Passwd) ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:pwhash_str_verify(PasswdHash, Passwd)
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> badarg
|
|
end.
|
|
|
|
prop_pwhash_str_verify() ->
|
|
?FORALL({Passwd},
|
|
{?FAULT_RATE(1, 40, g_iodata())},
|
|
begin
|
|
case v_iodata(Passwd) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
{ok, Ascii} = enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd),
|
|
S = enacl:pwhash_str_verify(Ascii, Passwd),
|
|
equals(S, true);
|
|
false ->
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:pwhash_str(Passwd) end),
|
|
badargs(fun() -> enacl:pwhash_str_verify("", Passwd) end)
|
|
end
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
%% SUBTLE HASHING
|
|
%% ---------------------------
|
|
diff_pair() ->
|
|
?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_iodata(), g_iodata()},
|
|
iolist_to_binary(X) /= iolist_to_binary(Y)).
|
|
|
|
prop_crypto_hash_eq() ->
|
|
?FORALL(X, g_iodata(),
|
|
case v_iodata(X) of
|
|
true -> equals(enacl:hash(X), enacl:hash(X));
|
|
false ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:hash(X),
|
|
false
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> true
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
).
|
|
|
|
prop_crypto_hash_neq() ->
|
|
?FORALL({X, Y}, diff_pair(),
|
|
enacl:hash(X) /= enacl:hash(Y)
|
|
).
|
|
|
|
%% STRING COMPARISON
|
|
%% -------------------------
|
|
%% * verify_16/2,
|
|
%% * verify_32/2
|
|
verify_pair_bad(Sz) ->
|
|
?LET(X, elements([fst, snd]),
|
|
case X of
|
|
fst ->
|
|
{?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz), binary(Sz)};
|
|
snd ->
|
|
{binary(Sz), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)}
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
verify_pair_good(Sz) ->
|
|
oneof([
|
|
?LET(Bin, binary(Sz), {Bin, Bin}),
|
|
?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {binary(Sz), binary(Sz)}, X /= Y)]).
|
|
|
|
verify_pair(Sz) ->
|
|
?FAULT(verify_pair_bad(Sz), verify_pair_good(Sz)).
|
|
|
|
verify_pair_valid(Sz, X, Y) ->
|
|
byte_size(X) == Sz andalso byte_size(Y) == Sz.
|
|
|
|
prop_verify_16() ->
|
|
?FORALL({X, Y}, verify_pair(16),
|
|
case verify_pair_valid(16, X, Y) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
equals(X == Y, enacl:verify_16(X, Y));
|
|
false ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:verify_16(X, Y),
|
|
false
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> true
|
|
end
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
prop_verify_32() ->
|
|
?FORALL({X, Y}, verify_pair(32),
|
|
case verify_pair_valid(32, X, Y) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
equals(X == Y, enacl:verify_32(X, Y));
|
|
false ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:verify_32(X, Y),
|
|
false
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> true
|
|
end
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
%% RANDOMBYTES
|
|
%% ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
%% * randombytes/1
|
|
prop_randombytes() ->
|
|
?FORALL(X, g_nat(),
|
|
case is_nat(X) of
|
|
true ->
|
|
is_binary(enacl:randombytes(X));
|
|
false ->
|
|
try
|
|
enacl:randombytes(X),
|
|
false
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg ->
|
|
true
|
|
end
|
|
end).
|
|
|
|
%% INTERNAL FUNCTIONS
|
|
%% ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
badargs(Thunk) ->
|
|
try
|
|
Thunk(),
|
|
false
|
|
catch
|
|
error:badarg -> true
|
|
end.
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
% Joel Test Blobs
|
|
|
|
test_basic_signing() ->
|
|
#{ public := PK0, secret := SK0 } = enacl:sign_keypair(),
|
|
#{ public := PK1, secret := SK1 } = enacl:sign_keypair(),
|
|
MSG0 = <<"This is super s3Kr3t, srsly!">>,
|
|
[
|
|
%% (+) Sign and open using valid keypair
|
|
case enacl:sign_open(enacl:sign(MSG0, SK0), PK0) of
|
|
{ok,MSG1} -> MSG0==MSG1;
|
|
_ -> false
|
|
end
|
|
, %% (-) Sign and open using invalid keypair
|
|
case enacl:sign_open(enacl:sign(MSG0, SK0), PK1) of
|
|
{error,failed_verification} -> true;
|
|
_ -> false
|
|
end
|
|
, %% (+) Detached mode sig and verify
|
|
{ enacl:sign_verify_detached(enacl:sign_detached(MSG0, SK0), MSG0, PK0)
|
|
, enacl:sign_verify_detached(enacl:sign_detached(MSG0, SK1), MSG0, PK1)
|
|
}
|
|
, %% (-) Incorrect sigs/PKs/messages given during verify
|
|
{ false == enacl:sign_verify_detached(enacl:sign_detached(MSG0, SK0), MSG0, PK1)
|
|
, false == enacl:sign_verify_detached(enacl:sign_detached(MSG0, SK1), MSG0, PK0)
|
|
, false == enacl:sign_verify_detached(enacl:sign_detached(MSG0, SK0), <<"bzzt">>, PK0)
|
|
}
|
|
].
|