diff --git a/src/shake.erl b/src/shake.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c86282a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/shake.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+-module(shake).
+-export([start/1]).
+
+
+% X_Y_[Q_]ZZ = SecretKey
+%   Where
+%     X  :: A (Alice) | B (Bob)
+%     Y  :: P (Permanent) | A (Alternate) | E (Ephemeral)
+%     Q  :: E (ec25519) | X (x25519)
+%     ZZ :: ID | PK (Public Key) | S (Secret Key)
+%
+% The Alternate key only applies to Alice and is an ephemeral stand-in for a permanent ID
+% until the initial tunnel has already been established.
+
+start(ContractID) ->
+    {_A_P_ID, _A_P_E_KP = #{public := _A_P_E_PK, secret := _A_P_E_SK}} = hz_key_master:make_key(<<>>),
+    {_A_A_ID, A_A_E_KP = #{public := A_A_E_PK, secret := A_A_E_SK}} = hz_key_master:make_key(<<>>),
+    {_A_E_ID, A_E_E_KP = #{public := A_E_E_PK, secret := A_E_E_SK}} = hz_key_master:make_key(<<>>),
+    {B_P_ID, B_P_E_KP = #{public := B_P_E_PK, secret := B_P_E_SK}} = hz_key_master:make_key(<<>>),
+    {_B_E_ID, B_E_E_KP = #{public := B_E_E_PK, secret := B_E_E_SK}} = hz_key_master:make_key(<<>>),
+    ServiceIDs = [B_P_ID],
+    {IPs, Port, Salt, ServiceIDs} = resolve(ContractID, ServiceIDs),
+    Salt = <<"Notional Salt">>,
+    A_String = connect_string(A_A_E_PK, A_E_E_PK),
+    B_String = connect_string(B_P_E_PK, B_E_E_PK),
+    <<"GajuExpress:", Version:3/binary, ":", A_A_E_PK:32/binary, A_E_E_PK:32/binary>> = A_String,
+    % Key conversion
+%   #{public := A_P_X_PK, secret := A_P_X_SK} = convert(A_P_E_KP),
+    #{public := A_A_X_PK, secret := A_A_X_SK} = convert(A_A_E_KP),
+    #{public := A_E_X_PK, secret := A_E_X_SK} = convert(A_E_E_KP),
+    #{public := B_P_X_PK, secret := B_P_X_SK} = convert(B_P_E_KP),
+    #{public := B_E_X_PK, secret := B_E_X_SK} = convert(B_E_E_KP),
+    A_InitSessionKey = session_key(a, A_A_X_SK, B_P_X_PK, B_E_X_PK, Version, Salt),
+    B_InitSessionKey = session_key(b, B_P_X_SK, B_E_X_SK, A_A_X_PK, Version, Salt),
+    A_InitSessionKey =:= B_InitSessionKey.
+
+
+connect_string(PK1, PK2) ->
+    <<(proto_name())/binary, ":", (proto_version())/binary, ":", PK1/binary, PK2/binary>>.
+
+proto_name() ->
+    <<"GajuExpress">>.
+
+proto_version() ->
+    <<"001">>.
+
+
+resolve(ContractID, IDs) ->
+    ok = io:format("Would resolve ~p now...~n", [ContractID]),
+    {["localhost", "127.0.0.1"], 7777, <<"Notional Salt">>, IDs}.
+
+
+convert(#{public := PK, secret := <<Secret:32/binary, _/binary>>}) ->
+    #{public => ed25519_pk_to_x25519(PK), secret => ed25519_sk_to_x25519(Secret)}.
+
+
+%% Curve25519 Prime Field Constant: 2^255 - 19
+%% Yes, in hex it read kind of like "lucky fed"
+p() -> 16#7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFED.
+
+ed25519_pk_to_x25519(<<ED25519_PK:32/binary>>) ->
+    <<CompressedInt:256/little-integer>> = ED25519_PK,
+    %% Clear the sign bit (MSB) to get the raw y-coordinate
+    Y = CompressedInt band ((1 bsl 255) - 1),
+    
+    %% Compute u = (1 + y) / (1 - y) mod P
+    Num = (1 + Y) rem p(),
+    Den = (1 - Y + p()) rem p(),
+    
+    case Den =:= 0 of
+        true -> 
+            % If y == 1, the point maps to the point at infinity.
+            % On X25519, this translates to u = 0.
+            <<0:256/little-integer>>;
+        false ->
+            U = (Num * mod_inv(Den, p())) rem p(),
+            <<U:256/little-integer>>
+    end.
+
+ed25519_sk_to_x25519(<<ED25519_SK_Secret:32/binary>>) ->
+    %% Hash seed and slice the first 32 bytes (clamping done internally by crypto)
+    <<X25519_SK:32/binary, _/binary>> = crypto:hash(sha512, ED25519_SK_Secret),
+    X25519_SK.
+
+mod_inv(A, M) ->
+    {1, X, _} = ext_gcd(A, M),
+    (X + M) rem M.
+
+ext_gcd(A, 0) ->
+    {A, 1, 0};
+ext_gcd(A, B) ->
+    {G, X1, Y1} = ext_gcd(B, A rem B),
+    {G, Y1, X1 - (A div B) * Y1}.
+
+
+session_key(a, A_A_X_SK, B_P_X_PK, B_E_X_PK, Version, Salt) ->
+    DH_Static    = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, B_P_X_PK, A_A_X_SK, x25519),
+    DH_Ephemeral = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, B_E_X_PK, A_A_X_SK, x25519),
+    finalize_hkdf(DH_Static, DH_Ephemeral, Version, Salt);
+session_key(b, B_P_X_SK, B_E_X_SK, A_A_X_PK, Version, Salt) ->
+    DH_Static    = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, A_A_X_PK, B_P_X_SK, x25519),
+    DH_Ephemeral = crypto:compute_key(ecdh, A_A_X_PK, B_E_X_SK, x25519),
+    finalize_hkdf(DH_Static, DH_Ephemeral, Version, Salt).
+
+finalize_hkdf(DH_Static, DH_Ephemeral, Version, Salt) ->
+    MixedInput = <<DH_Static/binary, DH_Ephemeral/binary>>,
+    Info       = <<"GajuExpress:", Version/binary, ":">>,
+    hkdf(sha256, MixedInput, Salt, Info).
+
+
+hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info) ->
+    hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info, 32).
+
+hkdf(Hash, IKM, Salt, Info, OutLen) ->
+    PRK = extract(Hash, Salt, IKM),
+    expand(Hash, PRK, Info, OutLen).
+
+extract(Hash, <<>>, IKM) ->
+    %% If salt is empty RFC 5869 dictates using a string of zeros equal to hash size
+    Salt = binary:copy(<<0>>, hash_size(Hash)),
+    extract(Hash, Salt, IKM);
+extract(Hash, Salt, IKM) ->
+    crypto:mac(hmac, Hash, Salt, IKM).
+
+expand(Hash, PRK, Info, OutLen) ->
+    HashLen = hash_size(Hash),
+    BlockCount = (OutLen + HashLen - 1) div HashLen,
+    case BlockCount > 255 of
+        true ->
+            error(hkdf_length_too_long);
+        false -> 
+            FullBlocks = expand_loop(Hash, PRK, Info, BlockCount, 1, <<>>, <<>>),
+            %% Slice off excess trailing bytes to match exactly specified OutLen
+            <<Output:OutLen/binary, _/binary>> = FullBlocks,
+            Output
+    end.
+
+expand_loop(Hash, PRK, Info, N, Counter, PrevT, Acc) when Counter =< N ->
+    %% Form block payload: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i-1) | info | i)
+    Payload = <<PrevT/binary, Info/binary, Counter:8>>,
+    T = crypto:mac(hmac, Hash, PRK, Payload),
+    expand_loop(Hash, PRK, Info, N, Counter + 1, T, <<Acc/binary, T/binary>>);
+expand_loop(_, _, _, _, _, _, Acc) ->
+    Acc.
+
+hash_size(md5)    -> 16;
+hash_size(sha)    -> 20;
+hash_size(sha224) -> 28;
+hash_size(sha256) -> 32;
+hash_size(sha384) -> 48;
+hash_size(sha512) -> 64.
+
+    
+
+% alice_start(ContractID) ->
+%     {Pub, Sec} = crypto:generate_key(ecdh, secp256k1),
+%     alice_start(Sec, Pub, ContractID).
+% 
+% alice_start(Sec, Pub, ContractID) ->
+%     case net_lookup(ContractID) of
+%         {ok, BobsIDs, Salt, Address, Port} -> connect(Sec, Pub, BobsIDs, Salt, Address, Port);
+%         Error                              -> Error
+%     end.
+% 
+% connect(Sec, Pub, BobsIDs, Salt, Address, Port) ->
+%     Options = [{mode, binary}, {active, once}, {packet, 4}, {keepalive, true}],
+%     case gen_tcp:connect(Address, Port, Options, 5000) of
+%         {ok, Sock} -> push(Sec, Pub, BobsIDs, Salt, Sock);
+%         Error      -> Error
+%     end.
+% 
+% push(Sec, Pub, BobsIDs, Salt, Sock) ->
+%     case gen_tcp:send(Sock, <<"BOBSandVAGEN:001:", Pub/binary>>) of
+%         ok    -> await(Sec, BobsIDs, Salt, Sock);
+%         Error -> Error
+%     end.
+% 
+% await(Sec, BobsIDs, Salt, Sock) ->
+%     ok = inet:setopts(Sock, [{active, once}]),
+%     receive
+%         {tcp, Sock, <<"BOBSandVAGEN:001:", B_S_Pub:65/binary, B_E_Pub:65/binary>>} ->
+%             check(Sec, BobsIDs, B_S_Pub, B_E_Pub, Salt, Sock);
+%         Other ->
+%             ok = log(info, "Weird: ~p", [Other]),
+%             {error, junk}
+%         after 5000 ->
+%             {error, timeout}
+%     end.
+% 
+% check(A_E_Sec, BobsIDs, B_S_Pub, B_E_Pub, Salt, Sock) ->
+%     case lists:member(B_S_Pub, BobsIDs) of
+%         true  -> gen_session(A_E_Sec, B_S_Pub, B_E_Pub, Salt, Sock);
+%         false -> {error, bad_id}
+%     end.
+% 
+% gen_session(A_E_Sec, B_S_Pub, B_E_Pub, Salt, Sock) ->
+%     case session_key(A_E_Sec, B_S_Pub, B_E_Pub, <<"001">>, Salt) of
+%         {ok, SessionKey} -> loop(SessionKey, Sock);
+%         Error            -> Error
+%     end.