Streamline naming
More changes before 1.0 with a more direct naming scheme.
This commit is contained in:
Jesper Louis Andersen
+48
-27
@@ -83,8 +83,8 @@ v_binary(_, _) -> false.
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%% Typical generators based on the binaries
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nonce() -> g_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size()).
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nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N).
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nonce() -> g_binary(enacl:box_NONCEBYTES()).
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nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_NONCEBYTES(), N).
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%% Generator of natural numbers
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g_nat() ->
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@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ keypair_bad() ->
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK} = enacl:box_keypair(),
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case X of
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pk ->
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PKBytes = enacl:box_public_key_bytes(),
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PKBytes = enacl:box_PUBLICKEYBYTES(),
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{oneof([return(a), nat(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= PKBytes)]), SK};
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sk ->
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SKBytes = enacl:box_secret_key_bytes(),
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SKBytes = enacl:box_SECRETKEYBYTES(),
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{PK, oneof([return(a), nat(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= SKBytes)])}
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end
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end).
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@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ g_generichash_size() ->
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%% * box_afternm/3
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%% * box_open_afternm/3
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keypair_valid(PK, SK) when is_binary(PK), is_binary(SK) ->
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PKBytes = enacl:box_public_key_bytes(),
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SKBytes = enacl:box_secret_key_bytes(),
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PKBytes = enacl:box_PUBLICKEYBYTES(),
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SKBytes = enacl:box_SECRETKEYBYTES(),
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byte_size(PK) == PKBytes andalso byte_size(SK) == SKBytes;
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keypair_valid(_PK, _SK) -> false.
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@@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ beforenm_key() ->
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oneof([
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elements([a,b,c]),
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real(),
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?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:box_beforenm_bytes())
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?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:box_BEFORENMBYTES())
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])
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end).
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v_key(K) when is_binary(K) -> byte_size(K) == enacl:box_beforenm_bytes();
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v_key(K) when is_binary(K) -> byte_size(K) == enacl:box_BEFORENMBYTES();
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v_key(_) -> false.
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prop_beforenm_correct() ->
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@@ -324,11 +324,11 @@ sign_keypair_bad() ->
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KP = enacl:sign_keypair(),
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case X of
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pk ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_public_size(),
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Sz = enacl:sign_PUBLICBYTES(),
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?LET(Wrong, oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)]),
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KP#{ public := Wrong });
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sk ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_secret_size(),
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Sz = enacl:sign_SECRETBYTES(),
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?LET(Wrong, oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)]),
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KP#{ secret := Wrong })
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end
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@@ -342,12 +342,12 @@ sign_keypair() ->
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sign_keypair_public_valid(#{ public := Public })
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when is_binary(Public) ->
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byte_size(Public) == enacl:sign_keypair_public_size();
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byte_size(Public) == enacl:sign_PUBLICBYTES();
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sign_keypair_public_valid(_) -> false.
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sign_keypair_secret_valid(#{ secret := Secret })
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when is_binary(Secret) ->
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byte_size(Secret) == enacl:sign_keypair_secret_size();
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byte_size(Secret) == enacl:sign_SECRETBYTES();
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sign_keypair_secret_valid(_) -> false.
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sign_keypair_valid(KP) ->
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@@ -408,11 +408,11 @@ signed_message_good_d(M) ->
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end)}]).
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signed_message_bad() ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_public_size(),
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Sz = enacl:sign_PUBLICBYTES(),
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{binary(), oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(Sz), byte_size(B) /= Sz)])}.
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signed_message_bad_d() ->
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Sz = enacl:sign_keypair_public_size(),
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Sz = enacl:sign_PUBLICBYTES(),
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{binary(), oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(Sz), byte_size(B) /= Sz)])}.
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signed_message(M) ->
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@@ -496,19 +496,19 @@ prop_seal_box_correct() ->
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%% * secretbox/3
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%% * secretbo_open/3
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secret_key_good() ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_KEYBYTES(),
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binary(Sz).
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secret_key_bad() ->
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oneof([return(a),
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nat(),
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?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= enacl:secretbox_key_size())]).
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?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= enacl:secretbox_KEYBYTES())]).
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secret_key() ->
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?FAULT(secret_key_bad(), secret_key_good()).
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secret_key_valid(SK) when is_binary(SK) ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_KEYBYTES(),
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byte_size(SK) == Sz;
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secret_key_valid(_SK) -> false.
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@@ -618,6 +618,27 @@ xor_bytes(<<A, As/binary>>, <<B, Bs/binary>>) ->
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[A bxor B | xor_bytes(As, Bs)];
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xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
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positive() ->
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?LET(N, nat(), N+1).
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chacha20_nonce() ->
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Sz = enacl:stream_chacha20_NONCEBYTES(),
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binary(Sz).
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chacha20_key() ->
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Sz = enacl:stream_chacha20_KEYBYTES(),
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binary(Sz).
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prop_stream_chacha20_correct() ->
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?FORALL(Len, positive(),
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?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, {binary(Len), chacha20_nonce(), chacha20_key()},
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begin
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CT = enacl:stream_chacha20_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key),
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Stream = enacl:stream_chacha20(Len, Nonce, Key),
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CT2 = list_to_binary(xor_bytes(Stream, Msg)),
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equals(CT, CT2)
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end)).
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%% CRYPTO AUTH
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%% ------------------------------------------------------------
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%% * auth/2
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@@ -635,19 +656,19 @@ prop_auth_correct() ->
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end).
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authenticator_bad() ->
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oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:auth_size())]).
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oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:auth_BYTES())]).
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authenticator_good(Msg, Key) when is_binary(Key) ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_KEYBYTES(),
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso byte_size(Key) == Sz of
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true ->
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frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:auth_size())})},
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frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:auth_BYTES())})},
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{3, return({valid, enacl:auth(Msg, Key)})}]);
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false ->
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binary(enacl:auth_size())
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binary(enacl:auth_BYTES())
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end;
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authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) ->
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binary(enacl:auth_size()).
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binary(enacl:auth_BYTES()).
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authenticator(Msg, Key) ->
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?FAULT(authenticator_bad(), authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
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@@ -690,19 +711,19 @@ prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
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end).
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ot_authenticator_bad() ->
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oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:onetime_auth_size())]).
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oneof([a, int(), ?SUCHTHAT(X, binary(), byte_size(X) /= enacl:onetime_auth_BYTES())]).
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ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key) when is_binary(Key) ->
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
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Sz = enacl:secretbox_KEYBYTES(),
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case v_iodata(Msg) andalso byte_size(Key) == Sz of
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true ->
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frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:onetime_auth_size())})},
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frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:onetime_auth_BYTES())})},
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{3, return({valid, enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key)})}]);
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false ->
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binary(enacl:onetime_auth_size())
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binary(enacl:onetime_auth_BYTES())
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end;
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ot_authenticator_good(_Msg, _Key) ->
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binary(enacl:auth_size()).
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binary(enacl:auth_BYTES()).
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ot_authenticator(Msg, Key) ->
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?FAULT(ot_authenticator_bad(), ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key)).
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