Inject faults into iodata() values.

This further verifies the test cases and also the enacl API. By injecting
wrong data, we verify that given incorrect data will make the system fail
and error(badarg) all over the place.

eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ failure(_) -> false.
 
 prop_box_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ prop_box_correct() ->
 
 prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
                     Err = enacl:box_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, PK1, SK2),
                     equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
                 false ->
-                    case box(iolist_to_binary(Msg), Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
+                    case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
                       badarg -> true;
                       Res ->
                         failure(box_open(Res, Nonce, PK1, SK2))
@@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ sign_keypair_valid(KP) ->
   sign_keypair_public_valid(KP) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KP).
 
 prop_sign() ->
-    ?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, {g_iodata(), fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
+    ?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair},
+          {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
+           fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
       begin
         case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
           true ->
@@ -334,7 +336,7 @@ secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
 
 prop_secretbox_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
       begin
@@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
 
 prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
         case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
@@ -399,7 +401,7 @@ prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
 %% CRYPTO AUTH
 prop_auth_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Key},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
        case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
          true ->
@@ -414,7 +416,7 @@ authenticator_bad() ->
 
 authenticator_good(Msg, Key) when is_binary(Key) ->
     Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
-    case byte_size(Key) == Sz of
+    case v_iodata(Msg) andalso byte_size(Key) == Sz of
       true ->
         frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:auth_size())})},
                    {3, return({valid, enacl:auth(Msg, Key)})}]);
@@ -433,7 +435,7 @@ authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
 
 prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Key},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
       ?FORALL(Authenticator, authenticator(Msg, Key),
         case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
@@ -451,7 +453,7 @@ prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
 %% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH
 prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Key},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
        case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
          true ->
@@ -466,7 +468,7 @@ ot_authenticator_bad() ->
 
 ot_authenticator_good(Msg, Key) when is_binary(Key) ->
     Sz = enacl:secretbox_key_size(),
-    case byte_size(Key) == Sz of
+    case v_iodata(Msg) andalso byte_size(Key) == Sz of
       true ->
         frequency([{1, ?LAZY({invalid, binary(enacl:onetime_auth_size())})},
                    {3, return({valid, enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key)})}]);
@@ -485,7 +487,7 @@ ot_authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
 
 prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
     ?FORALL({Msg, Key},
-            {g_iodata(),
+            {fault_rate(1, 40, g_iodata()),
              fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
       ?FORALL(Authenticator, ot_authenticator(Msg, Key),
         case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of