Introduce iodata() in the EQC tests.
Introduce a type for iodata() in the EQC tests. Use this type throughout the tests in order to make sure we can supply iodata() in all places where we claim we can supply iodata().
This commit is contained in:
Jesper Louis Andersen
parent
797daa653b
commit
b1ed21e71d
@ -2,6 +2,50 @@
|
||||
-include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl").
|
||||
-compile(export_all).
|
||||
|
||||
non_byte_int() ->
|
||||
oneof([
|
||||
?LET(N, nat(), -(N+1)),
|
||||
?LET(N, nat(), N+256)
|
||||
]).
|
||||
|
||||
g_iolist() ->
|
||||
?SIZED(Sz, g_iolist(Sz)).
|
||||
|
||||
g_iolist(0) ->
|
||||
fault(
|
||||
oneof([
|
||||
elements([a,b,c]),
|
||||
real(),
|
||||
non_byte_int()
|
||||
]),
|
||||
return([]));
|
||||
g_iolist(N) ->
|
||||
fault(
|
||||
oneof([
|
||||
elements([a,b,c]),
|
||||
real(),
|
||||
non_byte_int()
|
||||
]),
|
||||
frequency([
|
||||
{1, g_iolist(0)},
|
||||
{N, ?LAZY(list(oneof([char(), binary(), g_iolist(N div 4)])))}
|
||||
])).
|
||||
|
||||
g_iodata() ->
|
||||
fault(
|
||||
oneof([elements([a,b,c]), real()]),
|
||||
oneof([binary(), g_iolist()])).
|
||||
|
||||
v_iolist([]) -> true;
|
||||
v_iolist([B|Xs]) when is_binary(B) -> v_iolist(Xs);
|
||||
v_iolist([C|Xs]) when is_integer(C), C >= 0, C < 256 -> v_iolist(Xs);
|
||||
v_iolist([L|Xs]) when is_list(L) ->
|
||||
v_iolist(L) andalso v_iolist(Xs);
|
||||
v_iolist(_) -> false.
|
||||
|
||||
v_iodata(B) when is_binary(B) -> true;
|
||||
v_iodata(Structure) -> v_iolist(Structure).
|
||||
|
||||
%% Generator for binaries of a given size with different properties and fault injection:
|
||||
g_binary(Sz) ->
|
||||
fault(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)).
|
||||
@ -13,13 +57,15 @@ g_binary_bad(Sz) ->
|
||||
frequency([
|
||||
{5, ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)},
|
||||
{1, elements([a, b])},
|
||||
{1, int()}
|
||||
{1, int()},
|
||||
{1, g_iodata()}
|
||||
]).
|
||||
|
||||
v_binary(Sz, N) when is_binary(N) ->
|
||||
byte_size(N) == Sz;
|
||||
v_binary(_, _) -> false.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%% Typical generators based on the binaries
|
||||
nonce() -> g_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size()).
|
||||
nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N).
|
||||
@ -95,16 +141,16 @@ failure(_) -> false.
|
||||
|
||||
prop_box_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
|
||||
begin
|
||||
case nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
CipherText = enacl:box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1),
|
||||
{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_open(CipherText, Nonce, PK1, SK2),
|
||||
equals(Msg, DecodedMsg);
|
||||
equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
|
||||
false ->
|
||||
case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
|
||||
badarg -> true;
|
||||
@ -115,12 +161,13 @@ prop_box_correct() ->
|
||||
|
||||
prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
|
||||
begin
|
||||
case nonce_valid(Nonce)
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg)
|
||||
andalso nonce_valid(Nonce)
|
||||
andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1)
|
||||
andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
@ -128,7 +175,7 @@ prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
|
||||
Err = enacl:box_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, PK1, SK2),
|
||||
equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
|
||||
false ->
|
||||
case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
|
||||
case box(iolist_to_binary(Msg), Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
|
||||
badarg -> true;
|
||||
Res ->
|
||||
failure(box_open(Res, Nonce, PK1, SK2))
|
||||
@ -182,9 +229,9 @@ sign_keypair_valid(KP) ->
|
||||
sign_keypair_public_valid(KP) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KP).
|
||||
|
||||
prop_sign() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, {binary(), fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, {g_iodata(), fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
|
||||
begin
|
||||
case sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
#{ secret := Secret } = KeyPair,
|
||||
enacl:sign(Msg, Secret),
|
||||
@ -218,13 +265,13 @@ signed_message_valid({invalid, _}, _) -> true;
|
||||
signed_message_valid(_, _) -> false.
|
||||
|
||||
prop_sign_open() ->
|
||||
?FORALL(Msg, binary(),
|
||||
?FORALL(Msg, g_iodata(),
|
||||
?FORALL({SignMsg, PK}, signed_message(Msg),
|
||||
case signed_message_valid(SignMsg, PK) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso signed_message_valid(SignMsg, PK) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
case SignMsg of
|
||||
{valid, SM} ->
|
||||
equals({ok, Msg}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK));
|
||||
equals({ok, iolist_to_binary(Msg)}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK));
|
||||
{invalid, SM} ->
|
||||
equals({error, failed_verification}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK))
|
||||
end;
|
||||
@ -287,15 +334,15 @@ secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
|
||||
|
||||
prop_secretbox_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
||||
begin
|
||||
case nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
CipherText = enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key),
|
||||
{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:secretbox_open(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
|
||||
equals(Msg, DecodedMsg);
|
||||
equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
|
||||
false ->
|
||||
case secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key) of
|
||||
badarg -> true;
|
||||
@ -306,7 +353,7 @@ prop_secretbox_correct() ->
|
||||
end).
|
||||
|
||||
prop_secretbox_failure_integrity() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, {binary(), nonce(), secret_key()},
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, {g_iodata(), nonce(), secret_key()},
|
||||
begin
|
||||
CipherText = enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key),
|
||||
Err = enacl:secretbox_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, Key),
|
||||
@ -327,15 +374,24 @@ prop_stream_correct() ->
|
||||
badargs(fun() -> enacl:stream(Len, Nonce, Key) end)
|
||||
end).
|
||||
|
||||
xor_bytes(<<A, As/binary>>, <<B, Bs/binary>>) ->
|
||||
[A bxor B | xor_bytes(As, Bs)];
|
||||
xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
|
||||
|
||||
prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
||||
case nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
Stream = enacl:stream(iolist_size(Msg), Nonce, Key),
|
||||
CipherText = enacl:stream_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key),
|
||||
equals(Msg, enacl:stream_xor(CipherText, Nonce, Key));
|
||||
StreamXor = enacl:stream_xor(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
|
||||
conjunction([
|
||||
{'xor', equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), StreamXor)},
|
||||
{stream, equals(iolist_to_binary(xor_bytes(Stream, iolist_to_binary(Msg))), CipherText)}
|
||||
]);
|
||||
false ->
|
||||
badargs(fun() -> enacl:stream_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key) end)
|
||||
end).
|
||||
@ -343,9 +399,9 @@ prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
|
||||
%% CRYPTO AUTH
|
||||
prop_auth_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
||||
case secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
Authenticator = enacl:auth(Msg, Key),
|
||||
equals(Authenticator, enacl:auth(Msg, Key));
|
||||
@ -377,10 +433,10 @@ authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
|
||||
|
||||
prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
||||
?FORALL(Authenticator, authenticator(Msg, Key),
|
||||
case secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
case Authenticator of
|
||||
{valid, A} ->
|
||||
@ -395,9 +451,9 @@ prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
|
||||
%% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH
|
||||
prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
||||
case secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
Authenticator = enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key),
|
||||
equals(Authenticator, enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key));
|
||||
@ -429,10 +485,10 @@ ot_authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
|
||||
|
||||
prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
|
||||
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
|
||||
{binary(),
|
||||
{g_iodata(),
|
||||
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
|
||||
?FORALL(Authenticator, ot_authenticator(Msg, Key),
|
||||
case secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
|
||||
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
|
||||
true ->
|
||||
case Authenticator of
|
||||
{valid, A} ->
|
||||
@ -446,14 +502,13 @@ prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
|
||||
|
||||
%% HASHING
|
||||
%% ---------------------------
|
||||
diff_pair(Sz) ->
|
||||
?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_binary(Sz), g_binary(Sz)},
|
||||
X /= Y).
|
||||
diff_pair() ->
|
||||
?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_iodata(), g_iodata()},
|
||||
iolist_to_binary(X) /= iolist_to_binary(Y)).
|
||||
|
||||
prop_crypto_hash_eq() ->
|
||||
?FORALL(Sz, oneof([1, 128, 1024, 1024*4]),
|
||||
?FORALL(X, g_binary(Sz),
|
||||
case is_binary(X) of
|
||||
?FORALL(X, g_iodata(),
|
||||
case v_iodata(X) of
|
||||
true -> equals(enacl:hash(X), enacl:hash(X));
|
||||
false ->
|
||||
try
|
||||
@ -463,13 +518,12 @@ prop_crypto_hash_eq() ->
|
||||
error:badarg -> true
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
)).
|
||||
).
|
||||
|
||||
prop_crypto_hash_neq() ->
|
||||
?FORALL(Sz, oneof([1, 128, 1024, 1024*4]),
|
||||
?FORALL({X, Y}, diff_pair(Sz),
|
||||
?FORALL({X, Y}, diff_pair(),
|
||||
enacl:hash(X) /= enacl:hash(Y)
|
||||
)).
|
||||
).
|
||||
|
||||
%% STRING COMPARISON
|
||||
%% -------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user