Streamlining of secret and _verify

The secret key API is now streamlined.

Also, all verify-type functions are
now returning boolean() values.
This makes the API consistent.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](http://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.
 
 - Go through all calls and make them return streamlined exceptions if applicable.
   Pretty large change, but OTOH, this ought to happen before a 1.0 release as well.
-  - secret
   - sign
 
 - Implement missing EQC tests
@@ -27,6 +26,8 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](http://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.
   `aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_*` but note it is *not* just a simple substitution
   into your code.
 - The `kx` constants have been renamed to follow libsodium one-to-one.
+- All calls with `verify` now returns booleans. See `sign_verify_detached`, which
+  were changed by this.
 
 ### Removed
 - The functions of the form `aead_chacha20poly1305_*` were removed. They implement

c_src/secret.c

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_secretbox(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(padded_msg.size, &padded_ciphertext)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_secretbox(padded_ciphertext.data, padded_msg.data, padded_msg.size,
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_secretbox_open(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(padded_ciphertext.size, &padded_msg)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   if (crypto_secretbox_open(padded_msg.data, padded_ciphertext.data,
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_stream_chacha20(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(clen, &c)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_stream_chacha20(c.data, c.size, n.data, k.data);
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ enacl_crypto_stream_chacha20_xor(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(m.size, &c)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_stream_chacha20_xor(c.data, m.data, m.size, n.data, k.data);
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_stream(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(clen, &c)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_stream(c.data, c.size, n.data, k.data);
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_stream_xor(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(m.size, &c)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_stream_xor(c.data, m.data, m.size, n.data, k.data);
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_auth(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(crypto_auth_BYTES, &a)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_auth(a.data, m.data, m.size, k.data);
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_onetimeauth(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (!enif_alloc_binary(crypto_onetimeauth_BYTES, &a)) {
-    return enacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
+    return enacl_internal_error(env);
   }
 
   crypto_onetimeauth(a.data, m.data, m.size, k.data);

c_src/sign.c

@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enacl_crypto_sign_final_verify(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc,
   }
 
   if (0 == crypto_sign_final_verify(obj->state, sig.data, pk.data)) {
-    ret = enif_make_atom(env, ATOM_OK);
+    ret = enif_make_atom(env, "true");
   } else {
-    ret = enacl_error_tuple(env, "failed_verification");
+    ret = enif_make_atom(env, "false");
   }
   // Mark as done
   goto cleanup;

eqc_test/enacl_eqc.erl

@@ -421,9 +421,9 @@ prop_sign_detached_open() ->
               true ->
                   case SignMsg of
                     {valid, Sig} ->
-                        equals({ok, Msg}, enacl:sign_verify_detached(Sig, Msg, PK));
+                        equals(true, enacl:sign_verify_detached(Sig, Msg, PK));
                     {invalid, Sig} ->
-                        equals({error, failed_verification}, enacl:sign_verify_detached(Sig, Msg, PK))
+                        equals(false, enacl:sign_verify_detached(Sig, Msg, PK))
                   end;
               false ->
                   badargs(fun() -> enacl:sign_verify_detached(SignMsg, Msg, PK) end)

src/enacl.erl

@@ -623,17 +623,14 @@ sign_detached(M, SK) ->
 %% message for the given public key.
 %%
 %% Given a signature `SIG', a message `M', and a public key `PK', the function computes
-%% true iff the `SIG' is valid for `M' and `PK'.
+%% true iff the `SIG' is valid for `M' and `PK'; false otherwise.
--spec sign_verify_detached(SIG, M, PK) -> {ok, M} | {error, failed_verification}
+-spec sign_verify_detached(SIG, M, PK) -> boolean()
     when
       SIG :: binary(),
       M   :: iodata(),
       PK  :: binary().
 sign_verify_detached(SIG, M, PK) ->
-    case enacl_nif:crypto_sign_verify_detached(SIG, M, PK) of
+    enacl_nif:crypto_sign_verify_detached(SIG, M, PK).
-        true -> {ok, M};
-        false -> {error, failed_verification}
-    end.
 
 -type sign_state() :: reference().
 
@@ -669,7 +666,7 @@ sign_final_create(SignState, SK) ->
 %% Verifies that `SIG` is a valid signature for the message whose content has
 %% been previously supplied using `sign_update/2` using the public key `PK.`
 %% @end
--spec sign_final_verify(S, SIG, PK) -> ok | {error, failed_verification}
+-spec sign_final_verify(S, SIG, PK) -> boolean()
     when S :: sign_state(),
          SIG :: binary(),
          PK :: iodata().