EQC Test improvements
* Generalize binary generation because it is used again and again. * Use generalized binary generation in the hash functions since they are much faster as generators.
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@ -578,6 +578,81 @@ ERL_NIF_TERM enif_randombytes(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, ERL_NIF_TERM const argv[
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return enif_make_binary(env, &result);
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}
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/* Various other helper functions */
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void uint64_pack(unsigned char *y, ErlNifUInt64 x)
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{
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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*y++ = x; x >>= 8;
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}
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ErlNifUInt64
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uint64_unpack(const unsigned char *x)
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{
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ErlNifUInt64 result;
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result = x[7];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[6];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[5];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[4];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[3];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[2];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[1];
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result <<= 8; result |= x[0];
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return result;
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}
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int
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crypto_block(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *k)
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{
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ErlNifUInt64 v0 = uint64_unpack(in + 0);
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ErlNifUInt64 v1 = uint64_unpack(in + 8);
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ErlNifUInt64 k0 = uint64_unpack(k + 0);
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ErlNifUInt64 k1 = uint64_unpack(k + 8);
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ErlNifUInt64 k2 = uint64_unpack(k + 16);
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ErlNifUInt64 k3 = uint64_unpack(k + 24);
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ErlNifUInt64 sum = 0;
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ErlNifUInt64 delta = 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15;
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int i;
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for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) {
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sum += delta;
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v0 += ((v1<<7) + k0) ^ (v1 + sum) ^ ((v1>>12) + k1);
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v1 += ((v0<<16) + k2) ^ (v0 + sum) ^ ((v0>>8) + k3);
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}
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uint64_pack(out + 0,v0);
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uint64_pack(out + 8,v1);
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return 0;
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}
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static
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ERL_NIF_TERM enif_scramble_block_16(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, ERL_NIF_TERM const argv[])
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{
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ErlNifBinary in, out, key;
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if (
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(argc != 2) ||
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(!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[0], &in)) ||
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(!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[1], &key)) ||
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(in.size != 16) || (key.size != 32)) {
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return enif_make_badarg(env);
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}
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if (!enif_alloc_binary(in.size, &out)) {
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return nacl_error_tuple(env, "alloc_failed");
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}
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crypto_block(out.data, in.data, key.data);
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return enif_make_binary(env, &out);
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}
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/* Tie the knot to the Erlang world */
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static ErlNifFunc nif_funcs[] = {
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{"crypto_box_NONCEBYTES", 0, enif_crypto_box_NONCEBYTES},
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@ -635,7 +710,9 @@ static ErlNifFunc nif_funcs[] = {
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{"crypto_verify_32", 2, enif_crypto_verify_32},
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{"randombytes_b", 1, enif_randombytes},
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{"randombytes", 1, enif_randombytes, ERL_NIF_DIRTY_JOB_CPU_BOUND}
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{"randombytes", 1, enif_randombytes, ERL_NIF_DIRTY_JOB_CPU_BOUND},
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{"scramble_block_16", 2, enif_scramble_block_16}
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};
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@ -2,21 +2,26 @@
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-include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl").
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-compile(export_all).
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nonce_good() ->
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Sz = enacl:box_nonce_size(),
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binary(Sz).
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%% Generator for binaries of a given size with different properties and fault injection:
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g_binary(Sz) ->
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fault(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)).
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nonce_bad() ->
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Sz = enacl:box_nonce_size(),
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oneof([return(a), nat(), ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)]).
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g_binary_good(Sz) when Sz =< 32 -> binary(Sz);
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g_binary_good(Sz) -> eqc_gen:largebinary(Sz).
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nonce_valid(N) when is_binary(N) ->
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Sz = enacl:box_nonce_size(),
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g_binary_bad(Sz) ->
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frequency([
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{5, ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)},
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{1, elements([a, b])},
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{1, int()}
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]).
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v_binary(Sz, N) when is_binary(N) ->
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byte_size(N) == Sz;
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nonce_valid(_) -> false.
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v_binary(_, _) -> false.
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nonce() ->
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fault(nonce_bad(), nonce_good()).
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nonce() -> g_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size()).
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nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N).
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keypair_good() ->
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK} = enacl:box_keypair(),
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@ -426,24 +431,13 @@ prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
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%% HASHING
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%% ---------------------------
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diff_pair(Sz) ->
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?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {binary(Sz), binary(Sz)},
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?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_binary(Sz), g_binary(Sz)},
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X /= Y).
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data_bad() ->
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oneof([return(a), nat()]).
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data_good(Sz) -> binary(Sz).
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data(Sz) ->
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fault(data_bad(), data_good(Sz)).
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data_valid(B) when is_binary(B) -> true;
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data_valid(_B) -> false.
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prop_crypto_hash_eq() ->
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?FORALL(Sz, oneof([1, 128, 1024, 1024*4]),
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?FORALL(X, data(Sz),
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case data_valid(X) of
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?FORALL(X, g_binary(Sz),
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case is_binary(X) of
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true -> equals(enacl:hash(X), enacl:hash(X));
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false ->
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try
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25
src/enacl_ext.erl
Normal file
25
src/enacl_ext.erl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
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%%% @doc module enacl_ext implements various enacl extensions.
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%%% <p>None of the extensions listed here are part of the official NaCl library.
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%%% Things may be removed without further notice if it suddenly ends up being
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%%% better to do something differently than the solution given here.
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%%% </p>
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-module(enacl_ext).
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-export([
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scramble_block_16/2
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]).
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%% @doc scramble_block_16/2 scrambles (encrypt) a block under a given key
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%% The rules are that the block is 16 bytes and the key is 32 bytes. The block
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%% is scrambled by means of the (secret) key. This makes it impossible for an
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%% attacker to understand the original input for the scrambling. The intention
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%% of this method is to protect counters from leaking to the outside world, by
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%% scrambling them before they leave the system.
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%%
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%% Scrambling is done by means of the TEA algorithm (Tiny Encryption Algorithm)
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%% It has known weaknesses and should probably not be used long-term going
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%% forward, but CurveCP currently uses it for nonce scrambling.
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%% @end
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-spec scramble_block_16(binary(), binary()) -> binary().
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scramble_block_16(Block, Key) ->
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enacl_nif:scramble_block_16(Block, Key).
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@ -78,6 +78,11 @@
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randombytes_b/1
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]).
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%% Undocumented features :>
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-export([
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scramble_block_16/2
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]).
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-on_load(init/0).
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init() ->
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@ -153,3 +158,4 @@ crypto_verify_32(_X, _Y) -> not_loaded().
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randombytes(_RequestedSize) -> not_loaded().
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randombytes_b(_RequestedSize) -> not_loaded().
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scramble_block_16(_Block, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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