Add timing for all missing operations.
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d46ae1da16
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@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
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-define(HASH_REDUCTIONS, 2 * 200).
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-define(BOX_SIZE, 32 * 1024).
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-define(BOX_REDUCTIONS, 2 * 250).
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-define(SIGN_SIZE, 16 * 1024).
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-define(SIGN_REDUCTIONS, 2 * 350).
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%% Count reductions and number of scheduler yields for Fun. Fun is assumed
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%% to be one of the above exor variants.
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@ -218,7 +220,12 @@ sign_keypair() ->
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M :: binary(),
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SK :: binary(),
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SM :: binary().
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sign(M, SK) -> enacl_nif:crypto_sign(M, SK).
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sign(M, SK) when byte_size(M) =< ?SIGN_SIZE ->
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R = enacl_nif:crypto_sign_b(M, SK),
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bump(?SIGN_REDUCTIONS, ?SIGN_SIZE, byte_size(M)),
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R;
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sign(M, SK) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_sign(M, SK).
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%% @doc sign_open/2 opens a digital signature
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%% Given a signed message `SM' and a public key `PK', verify that the message has the right signature. Returns either
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@ -229,6 +236,13 @@ sign(M, SK) -> enacl_nif:crypto_sign(M, SK).
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SM :: binary(),
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PK :: binary(),
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M :: binary().
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sign_open(SM, PK) when byte_size(SM) =< ?SIGN_SIZE ->
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R = case enacl_nif:crypto_sign_open(SM, PK) of
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M when is_binary(M) -> {ok, M};
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{error, Err} -> {error, Err}
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end,
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bump(?SIGN_REDUCTIONS, ?SIGN_SIZE, byte_size(SM)),
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R;
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sign_open(SM, PK) ->
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case enacl_nif:crypto_sign_open(SM, PK) of
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M when is_binary(M) -> {ok, M};
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@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES() -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES() -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES() -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox(_CipherText, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_b(_CipherText, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_open(_CipherText, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_open_b(_CipherText, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox(_Msg, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_b(_Msg, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_open(_Msg, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_secretbox_open_b(_Msg, _Nonce, _Key) -> not_loaded().
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crypto_stream_KEYBYTES() -> not_loaded().
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crypto_stream_NONCEBYTES() -> not_loaded().
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@ -6,10 +6,145 @@
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all() ->
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[time_hashing(),
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time_box()].
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time_box(),
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time_sign(),
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time_secretbox(),
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time_stream(),
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time_auth(),
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time_onetimeauth()].
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-define(ROUNDS, 300).
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%% ONETIMEAUTH
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%% ------------
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time_onetimeauth() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 128,
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M = binary:copy(<<0>>, Sz),
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K = <<"secretsecretsecretsecretsecret32">>,
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T = timed(fun() -> onetime_auth(M, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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A = enacl:onetime_auth(M, K),
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T2 = timed(fun() -> onetime_auth_verify(A, M, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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true = enacl:onetime_auth_verify(A, M, K),
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[
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => onetime_auth },
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#{ size => Sz, time => T2, operation => onetime_auth_verify }
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].
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onetime_auth(_M, _K, 0) -> ok;
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onetime_auth(M, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_onetimeauth_b(M, K),
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onetime_auth(M, K, N-1).
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onetime_auth_verify(_A, _M, _K, 0) -> ok;
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onetime_auth_verify(A, M, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_onetimeauth_verify_b(A, M, K),
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onetime_auth_verify(A, M, K, N-1).
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%% AUTH
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%% -----------
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time_auth() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 32,
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M = binary:copy(<<0>>, Sz),
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K = <<"secretsecretsecretsecretsecret32">>,
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T = timed(fun() -> auth(M, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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A = enacl:auth(M, K),
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T2 = timed(fun() -> auth_verify(A, M, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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true = enacl:auth_verify(A, M, K),
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[
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => auth },
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#{ size => Sz, time => T2, operation => auth_verify }
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].
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auth(_M, _K, 0) -> ok;
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auth(M, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_auth_b(M, K),
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auth(M, K, N-1).
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auth_verify(_A, _M, _K, 0) -> ok;
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auth_verify(A, M, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_auth_verify_b(A, M, K),
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auth(M, K, N-1).
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%% STREAM
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%% -----------
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time_stream() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 128,
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K = <<"secretsecretsecretsecretsecret32">>,
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Nonce = <<0:192>>,
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T = timed(fun () -> stream(Sz, Nonce, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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M = binary:copy(<<0>>, Sz),
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T2 = timed(fun () -> stream_xor(M, Nonce, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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[
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => stream },
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#{ size => Sz, time => T2, operation => stream_xor }
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].
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stream(_Sz, _Nonce, _K, 0) -> ok;
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stream(Sz, Nonce, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_stream_b(Sz, Nonce, K),
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stream(Sz, Nonce, K, N-1).
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stream_xor(_M, _Nonce, _K, 0) -> ok;
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stream_xor(M, Nonce, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_stream_xor_b(M, Nonce, K),
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stream_xor(M, Nonce, K, N-1).
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%% SECRETBOX
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%% ----------
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time_secretbox() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 64,
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M = binary:copy(<<0>>, Sz),
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K = <<"secretsecretsecretsecretsecret32">>,
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Nonce = binary:copy(<<0:192>>),
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T = timed(fun() -> secretbox(M, Nonce, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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CT = enacl:secretbox(M, Nonce, K),
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T2 = timed(fun() -> secretbox_open(CT, Nonce, K, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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{ok, M} = enacl:secretbox_open(CT, Nonce, K),
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[
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => secretbox },
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#{ size => Sz, time => T2, operation => secretbox_open }
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].
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secretbox(_M, _Nonce, _K, 0) -> ok;
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secretbox(M, Nonce, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_secretbox_b(M, Nonce, K),
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secretbox(M, Nonce, K, N-1).
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secretbox_open(_M, _Nonce, _K, 0) -> ok;
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secretbox_open(M, Nonce, K, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_secretbox_open_b(M, Nonce, K),
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secretbox_open(M, Nonce, K, N-1).
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%% SIGN
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%% ---------
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time_sign() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 16,
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M = binary:copy(<<0>>, Sz),
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#{ public := PK, secret := SK } = enacl:sign_keypair(),
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T = timed(fun() -> sign(M, SK, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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SM = enacl:sign(M, SK),
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T2 = timed(fun() -> sign_open(SM, PK, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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[
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => sign },
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#{ size => Sz, time => T2, operation => sign_open }
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].
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sign(_M, _SK, 0) -> ok;
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sign(M, SK, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_sign_b(M, SK),
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sign(M, SK, N-1).
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sign_open(_SM, _PK, 0) -> ok;
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sign_open(SM, PK, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_sign_open_b(SM, PK),
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sign_open(SM, PK, N-1).
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%% BOX
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%% --------
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time_box() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 32,
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ZB = binary:copy(<<0>>, enacl_nif:crypto_box_ZEROBYTES()),
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@ -18,18 +153,14 @@ time_box() ->
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Nonce = binary:copy(<<0>>, enacl_nif:crypto_box_NONCEBYTES()),
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#{ public := PK1, secret := SK1 } = enacl:box_keypair(),
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#{ public := PK2, secret := SK2 } = enacl:box_keypair(),
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box([ZB, Bin], Nonce, PK1, SK2, ?ROUNDS),
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T = timed(fun() -> box([ZB, Bin], Nonce, PK1, SK2, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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Boxed = enacl:box([ZB, Bin], Nonce, PK1, SK2),
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box_open([BZB, Boxed], Nonce, PK2, SK1, ?ROUNDS),
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T2 = timed(fun() -> box_open([BZB, Boxed], Nonce, PK2, SK1, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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[
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => box},
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#{ size => Sz, time => T2, operation => box_open}
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].
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%% BOX
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%% --------
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box_open(_Bin, _Nonce, _PK, _SK, 0) -> ok;
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box_open(Bin, Nonce, PK, SK, N) ->
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enacl_nif:crypto_box_open_b(Bin, Nonce, PK, SK),
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@ -45,7 +176,6 @@ box(Bin, Nonce, PK, SK, N) ->
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time_hashing() ->
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Sz = 1024 * 32,
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Bin = binary:copy(<<0>>, Sz),
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hash(Bin, ?ROUNDS),
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T = timed(fun() -> hash(Bin, ?ROUNDS) end) / ?ROUNDS,
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#{ size => Sz, time => T, operation => hash}.
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@ -56,6 +186,7 @@ hash(Bin, N) ->
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%% Helpers
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timed(Fun) ->
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Fun(), % warmup
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{T, _} = timer:tc(Fun),
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T.
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